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What if Your Owners Also Own Other Firms in Your Industry? The 




The growth in institutional holdings of public firms has led to increased interest in the 
concept of common ownership, in which the same investor owns stakes in multiple firms within 
the same industry. Economic theory suggests that common ownership could affect firm 
performance, but little empirical research has examined the nature of this effect or how a firm’s 
extant marketing potentially relates to this effect. This paper addresses this gap by proposing a 
relationship between common ownership and firm performance that is moderated by the firm’s 
extant marketing capabilities and its relative marketing strategic emphasis. Our empirical 
approach employs data from over 43 million institutional holdings to develop a measure of 
common ownership and accounts for empirical issues like endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity. The results document a positive relationship between common ownership and 
firm performance and provide some evidence that this effect is stronger for firms with lower 
marketing capabilities and a relative strategic emphasis towards R&D spending. These results 
suggest that public policymakers should consider the firms’ extant strategic marketing when 
assessing regulations on common ownership. 
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“In 1950, institutional investors owned about 7 percent of the United States stock market; today they own 
almost 70 percent. If you count them as a single investor, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street are the 
largest owner of 88 percent of the companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500. Control of the economy has 
not been this concentrated since the Gilded Age.” 
---Posner, Morton, and Weyl (2016), in a New York Times Editorial 
1. Introduction 
Institutional investors, i.e., organizations such as banks, insurance companies, 
foundations, and mutual, hedge, and pension funds that manage at least $100 million in equity, 
are a mainstay of the U.S. economy (Azar et al., 2018). Institutional investors own 
approximately 75% of the outstanding equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. companies (Aguilar, 
2013) and directly manage trillions of dollars of shareholdings (Federal Trade Commission, 
2018). Their importance and overall clout in the economy has generated considerable interest 
from regulators and scholars across business and economic disciplines (e.g., Hansen & Hill, 
1991; McCahery et al., 2016). 
One consequence of the increasing concentration of overall equity holdings by 
institutional investors is that such investors now often own large stakes in multiple firms in the 
same industry, even when firms may be direct competitors (Kang et al., 2018). Consider the case 
of the two largest institutional investors: BlackRock and Vanguard. In the tech industry, 
BlackRock and Vanguard are the two largest shareholders for Microsoft and Apple. In the retail 
banking industry, BlackRock and Vanguard are among the three largest shareholders of Bank of 
America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, PNC Bank, US Bancorp, and Wells Fargo (Posner et al., 
2016). In the airline industry, in the soft drink industry, and even in smaller and less well-
publicized industries, such as cooking appliances, this pattern of relatively large ownership 
stakes across firms within industries continues (Posner et al., 2016). 
Recently, regulators (e.g., Federal Trade Commission, 2018), the popular press (e.g., 




al., 2018) have expressed concern regarding the potential consequences of the practice of 
institutional common ownership, where institutional investors own large and influential stakes in 
multiple and sometimes competing firms in an industry. For example, Noah Joshua Phillips, the 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioner, stated in a 2018 public policy conference:  
“I am interested, in particular, to see how common ownership impacts a broad set of 
industries, whether a clear mechanism of harm can be identified, a rationale for why 
managers put the interests of one set of shareholders above the others and a rigorous 
weighing of the pro-competitive effects of institutional shareholding. For now, I do not 
believe we know enough to warrant policy changes.” 
 
Commissioner Phillips also noted:  
“This debate is not just academic. In December 2017, the OECD held hearings [on the topic 
of institutional common ownership]; and European antitrust enforcers have begun putting 
common ownership theory into practice.”  
 
Further outlining concerns regarding institutional common ownership, Robert Jackson, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner, suggested that the debate 
on the consequences of institutional common ownership is centrally about “competition and 
consumer protection in the 21st Century” (Federal Trade Commission, 2018). Marketing, serving 
as the connection between the firm and consumers, is crucially related to competition and the 
resulting impact on consumer welfare. Thus, marketing academics can provide a unique 
perspective on how institutional common ownership may affect firm performance. Marketing 
academics possess a unique understanding of the interconnected relationships between owners, 
firms, managers, and customers, and how such relationships can impact firm performance (e.g., 
Joseph & Richardson, 2002; Srinivasan et al., 2018). This knowledge and perspective is crucial 
in developing theory-based knowledge, tactics, and strategies for how regulators should assess 
institutional common owners. In addition, extant research has demonstrated that institutional 
common ownership can affect firm profitability, competition, and consumer welfare via 




innovation productivity (e.g., He & Huang, 2017), indicating marketing’s potential as an 
important determinant of the consequences of institutional common ownership.  
However, despite its potential importance to public policy, to our knowledge, marketers 
have been absent from such debates, with no research in marketing heretofore investigating the 
concept of common ownership (see Table 1). This paper takes a first step to addressing this gap 
by introducing the topic of institutional common ownership to the marketing literature and 
proposing a conceptual model that examines the relationship between institutional common 
ownership and firm performance and explores how two high level strategic marketing variables 
potentially moderate that relationship.  
Central to our proposed model is the agency theory-based principal–agent paradigm (e.g., 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Institutional common owners (principals) often regularly engage with 
managers (agents) from firms to optimize firm actions that produce results with their customers, 
discuss how such results are driven by tactics regarding costs and revenues, and better 
understand why firms may not be performing as well as some of their competitors (Edmans et 
al., 2019). Further, institutional common owners regularly engage with managers (agents) from 
the multiple firms they own in an industry, which, enables common owners to accumulate and 
then provide greater insights to each of these firms than investors that have stakes in one firm 
(Park et al., 2019). Hence, institutional common owners possess a unique ability to influence the 
productivity of each of their individual firm’s operations (Kang et al., 2018), and a capability to 
provide greater market knowledge and a reduction in barriers to collaboration between their 
commonly owned firms (He & Huang, 2017). However, institutional common owners’ also have 
unique incentives due to their fiduciary responsibilities to maximize the performance of their 
entire portfolio of firms, which could come at the expense of individual firms (Backus et al., 




common owners may have a lesser ability to help by providing greater industry best practice 
knowledge.  
Therefore, we build on these conflicting theorized effects on whether institutional 
common owners’ impact on individual firm performance is positive (e.g., He & Huang, 2017) or 
negative (e.g., Azar et al., 2018) to propose a model to assess the impact of common ownership. 
We identify two strategic marketing characteristics as moderators or determinants of the relative 
effects of institutional common ownership on firm performance. The first moderator, the firm’s 
marketing capabilities, or ability to efficiently convert marketing inputs into sales outputs (Dutta 
et al., 1999), is proposed based on institutional common owners’ ability to provide gains in 
efficiencies and productivity (e.g., He et al., 2019) and their direct involvement and monitoring 
of a greater number of firms in the industry (Fich et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2018). The second 
moderator, the firm’s relative marketing strategic emphasis, or its spending on value-
appropriating (advertising) in relation to its spending on value creating (research and 
development [R&D]) activities (Mizik & Jacobson, 2003), is proposed based on institutional 
common owners’ ability to enhance long-term value creation activities (e.g., Connelly et al., 
2018) by affecting the productivity of the firm’s risk-taking with their ability to reduce barriers 
to collaboration (Faccio et al., 2011; He & Huang, 2017). Taken together, from a theoretical 
point of view, these two marketing moderators are proposed because they provide strategic-level 
measures for how the firm allocates marketing expenditures and how the firm efficiently utilizes 
those expenditures to generate sales, which as described in a subsequent section, is often 
institutional common owners’ main monitoring and engagement focus with their managers.  
To empirically test our proposed model, we employ data from 1986-2016 on 43,063,833 
institutional owner holdings across 22 industries to construct a measure of institutional common 




significantly associated with an increase in firm performance. Further, we find this effect is 
stronger for firms possessing lower marketing capabilities and stronger, under some model 
specifications, for firms that have a strategic emphasis oriented towards R&D rather than 
advertising spending. The key implications of these results is that, despite the focus on negative 
consequences of institutional common owners in popular press (e.g., Posner et al., 2016) and 
notable academic articles (e.g., Azar et al., 2018), institutional common ownership’s effects on 
competition and consumer protection are not uniform and, in fact, can be beneficial for certain 
firms. As such, public policy makers should account for the firm’s extant marketing efficiency 
and the emphasis of their marketing expenditures when considering regulations to limit the 
potential negative effects of institutional common ownership.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we provide background 
information on institutional investors and institutional common ownership. Subsequently, we 
describe our conceptual framework based on agency theory and develop our hypotheses. Then, 
we present and discuss the implications of our empirical analysis.  
2. Background on Institutional Investors and Institutional Common 
Ownership 
 
2.1. Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors are predominately sophisticated professional investors that strive to earn 
long-term profits for their clients (Connelly et al., 2018). Due to institutional investors’ holding 
size, investment strategies, influence on financial markets, and inability to sell underperforming 
firms, institutional owners often engage, directly or indirectly, with their firms (Edmans & 
Holderness, 2017).1 Directly, institutions often engage with the firm’s senior management and its 
                                                 
1 This includes the growing share of passive institutional investors, who prior research has demonstrated are not 
passive owners, in that they often engage and are active owners of their firms, despite their passive investing style 




board of directors about the firm’s direction and its strategic actions (Anton et al., 2018). For 
example, academic surveys on institutional investors (McCahery et al., 2016) and practitioner 
surveys on individual firms (Federal Trade Commission, 2018) have both reported that the vast 
majority of firms regularly engage in direct conversations with their institutional owners about 
the firm’s strategic actions. Further, institutional investors promote this engagement with firms 
as a core competitive advantage of employing their investment services. For instance, Vanguard, 
Blackrock, and State Street, the three largest institutional investors, have each promoted this 
capability on their websites, investment prospectuses, and executive communications (e.g., 
Posner et al., 2017). 
Indirectly, the ability for institutional investors to provide incentives and enforce 
discipline on the firm is important in motivating and facilitating strategic actions and processes 
that they consider advantageous for the firm (Brav et al., 2008). Five tactics that institutions 
employ to indirectly affect firm practices are (i) the appointment of board members, (ii) risk 
oversight, (iii) adjustment of executive compensation, (iv) implementation of corporate 
governance structures, and (v) public criticism of the firm either via announcements in the media 
or in support of shareholder proposals (e.g., Connelly et al., 2010; Vanguard, 2017).2 
Consequently, through their direct and indirect engagements with the firm, institutional owners 
are able to exert an influence in firm decision making (Backus et al., 2019).  
2.2. Institutional Common Owners 
Institutional investors often own considerable stakes in multiple firms in a single industry 
(Posner et al., 2016), a practice labeled as “institutional common ownership” (Azar et al., 2018). 
Institutional common owners have a fiduciary responsibility to their investors to maximize the 
                                                 
if they are terrible companies. As an indexer, our only action is our voice and so we are taking a more active 
dialogue with our companies and are imposing more of what we think is correct” (Authers, 2016). 




returns of their entire portfolio of firms, rather than the returns of each individual firm (O’Brien 
& Waehrer, 2017). Hence, concerns have been raised that institutional common owners’ interests 
and ability to influence firm activities can result in an adjustment to the principal-agent 
relationship that could lead to deviations from an optimal individual firm performance strategy 
(Azar et al., 2018; Backus et al., 2019). We expand on the theory underlying these concerns in 
the next section. 
The recognition of conflicting interests and potential deviations from firm optimal 
strategies due to institutional common owners’ or other owners’ unique interests is not new (e.g., 
Gilo et al., 2006). However, the concerns related to institutional common ownership have 
recently expanded because of research that empirically highlighted both the extent of the current 
concentration of institutional ownership (e.g., Posner et al., 2016) and that institutional common 
ownership is potentially related to lower competitive intensity and higher pricing in the airline 
industry (Azar et al., 2018). Hence, as summarized in Table 1, researchers from accounting, 
finance, economics, law, management, and operations have investigated the potential 
consequences (both positive and negative) of common ownership by linking institutional 
common ownership to firm performance outcomes due to changes in individual firms’ (i) 
competitive (or anti-competitive) strategies (e.g., Connelly et al., 2018; He & Huang, 2017), (ii) 
corporate governance policies (e.g., Lin et al., 2018; Kang et al., 2018), and (iii) mergers and 
acquisitions (e.g., Fich et al., 2015; Harford et al., 2011). Building on this prior research, we 
propose that a firm’s extant marketing strategy is also likely to be an important consideration in 
determining the nature of the effects of institutional common ownership on firm performance. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
Given the resource intensity and efficient allocation of resources required for firms to achieve 




role in how managers develop and implement firm processes and strategies. This notion is 
central to agency theory (e.g., Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), in which principals are 
theorized to design systems that incentivize and reward agents for developing firm strategies that 
align managerial actions with the principals’ best interests. In the traditional agency theory 
principal-agent paradigm, principals’ interests are typically identified as maximizing the 
individual firm’s performance in order to maximize their own returns (Fich et al., 2015). Thus, 
principals, such as institutional investors, attempt to align their agents’ incentives to maximize 
the individual firm’s performance. In contrast, since institutional common owners have a 
fiduciary obligation to maximize the profits of their entire portfolio, individual firm profit 
maximization may no longer be optimal for this set of the firm’s principals (Backus et al., 2019). 
Hence, the presence of institutional common ownership could create a misalignment of 
principal’s interests to focus on maximizing the performance of their overall portfolio of firms at 
the expense of individual firms (Azar et al., 2018). As such, institutional common owners, as 
principals, may attempt to influence their managers, as agents, to pursue policies and strategies 
that may not maximize individual firm performance.  
 Yet, individual firms are also likely to benefit from institutional common owners’ 
experience monitoring multiple firms (Kang et al., 2018) and ability to share knowledge gained 
from this monitoring to improve the productivity or efficiency in individual firm operations (He 
& Huang, 2017). Further, individual firms should benefit from institutional common owners that 
can supply informed and incentivized advice and oversight to minimize inefficient aggressive 
firm actions, such as advertising or price wars (Park et al., 2019), and enable firms to substitute 
investments in marketing capabilities and R&D output by reducing barriers to collaboration 




productivity or efficiencies is likely dependent on individual firms’ extant marketing capabilities, 
or ability to convert marketing inputs into sales outputs.  
In addition, individual firms are likely to benefit from institutional common owners’ 
ability to establish R&D and advertising collaborative partnerships with their other common 
owned firms in the industry (He & Huang, 2017). Further, individual firms with greater 
institutional common ownership should, on average, benefit from greater ability to manage risk 
due to more dispersed ownership stakes than firms with fewer institutional common owners that 
are less diversified and more risk averse (Faccio et al., 2011). Consequently, we expect that a 
firm’s strategic emphasis on longer-term and riskier value creation activities, such as R&D, 
relative to shorter-term value appropriation activities, such as advertising, will influence the 
benefits provided by institutional common owners’ ability to establish collaborative partnerships 
and encouragement to engage in greater risk-taking.  
Thus, we expect institutional common ownership to be related to firm performance, and a 
firm’s marketing capabilities and relative marketing strategic emphasis to moderate this 
relationship. However, the extant literature has not directly addressed this possibility. As such, 
we decided to augment our agency theory-based expectations with practitioner-based insights by 
conducting in-depth interviews with three institutional common owning fund managers that, 
respectively, manage several hundred million dollars, a couple billion dollars, and several billion 
dollars in holdings. Overall, the interviews revealed that the outcomes of institutional common 
owners’ regular engagements with management is remarkably similar to how agency theory 
posits that principals monitor and interact with their managers in attempts to maximize the 
profitability of their portfolios. Importantly, topics related to marketing play a role in these 
engagements because institutional investors often engage with managers to understand and 




producing the same level of results as some of their competitors. Further, institutional common 
owners’ engagement with management is often focused on factors associated with generating the 
firm’s costs and driving the firm’s revenues, e.g., how these costs and revenues compare to other 
firms they own in the industry and how the firm is actively managing these processes (i.e., the 
firm’s spending/resource allocation and the efficiency of such spending). Therefore, based on 
agency theory and our interviews, we propose the conceptual model depicted in Figure 1. Next, 
we provide further rationale for each of our hypotheses. 
4. Hypotheses 
4.1. Institutional Common Ownership and Firm Performance 
Institutional common owners’ fiduciary responsibility is to maximize the profitability of their 
entire portfolio of firms (Azar et al., 2018). As such, it has been suggested that institutional 
common owners are less motivated to provide oversight and incentivize and pressure the 
executives of each firm they own compared to other investors (Anton et al., 2018). This 
reduction in managerial oversight could make managers in the firms they own operate in a less 
optimal or “lazier” fashion, which would detrimentally effect firm performance (Azar et al., 
2018). Consequently, widespread general public concerns have been based on institutional 
common ownership causing a negative effect on the performance of individual firms (Backus et 
al., 2019). 
In contrast, our expectation, based on agency theory, research across economics, law, and 
business literatures, and insights from our interviews with institutional common owners, is that 
an increase in institutional common ownership will be associated with an increase in firm 
performance. Our theoretical rationale is as follows. First, while common owners may not 
observe all firm actions (e.g., Kempf et al., 2017), institutional common owners are still likely to 




ownership stakes in more firms than other types of investors (He et al., 2019). Thus, institutional 
common owners likely possess greater knowledge of industry best practices compared to owners 
with narrower or more concentrated portfolios (Kang et al., 2018). This enables institutional 
common owners to diffuse industry best practice knowledge among co-owned firms through 
their engagement with management, so these firms can employ such best practices to increase 
their performance (Connelly et al., 2018). 
Second, institutional common owners are highly motivated to reduce rivalries and 
potential industry-wide inefficiencies, such as R&D, price, or advertising wars (Park et al., 
2019), which can generate negative effects on their entire portfolio of firms in an industry 
(Connelly et al., 2018). Consequently, institutional common owners are motivated to serve as a 
conduit to lessen barriers of collaboration and reduce information asymmetry between co-owned 
competitors since they can benefit from the improved performance of each of their co-owned 
firms (He & Huang, 2017). Third, through prior experiences, common owners are expected to 
accumulate knowledge on how best to design appropriate incentives to better facilitate and 
advocate for the adoption of best practices by their firms (Posner et al., 2017).  
Therefore, in summary, we expect institutional common owners to learn what processes 
are effective in an industry, reduce barriers of collaborations with other firms, and more 
effectively influence firms to utilize such processes and collaborations. Further, through their 
regular engagements with management, we expect firms with greater institutional common 
ownership to improve their performance. In addition, we propose that these positive effects 
should overcome potential negative inefficiencies that could be attributed to common ownership, 
such as lower incentives to effectively monitor management (Azar et al., 2018) and misaligned 
incentives that prioritize improved industry rather than firm performance (Anton et al., 2018). 




H1: An increase in the institutional common ownership of a firm will be associated with an 
increase in the firm’s performance.  
 
4.2. The Moderating Role of Marketing 
4.2.1. Marketing Capabilities. Institutional common owners possess market knowledge 
and a capacity to foster tacit coordination with other firms that they own (Connelly et al., 2018). 
In addition, institutional common owners may have a greater ability to incentivize and facilitate 
firms to enact superior processes than other owners who may not have the same level of clout or 
experience in dealing with upper management (Posner et al., 2017). These strategic advantages 
should particularly benefit firms characterized by lower marketing capabilities. Marketing 
capabilities are regarded as “complex bundles of firm-level skills and knowledge that carry out 
marketing tasks and firm adaptation to marketplace changes” (Moorman & Day, 2016, p. 6). 
Hence, firms with lower marketing capabilities are less likely to be engaged in industry best 
practices and more likely to be engaged in less optimal competitive activities like advertising or 
pricing wars (Dutta et al., 1999). As such, when institutional common owners engage with 
management to encourage the use of best practices and help reduce industry-wide inefficiencies, 
the benefits will primarily accrue to their firms that are not initially as efficient in converting 
marketing inputs into sales outputs. Consequently, we expect: 
H2: The positive effect of institutional common ownership on a firm’s performance will be 
weaker (stronger) for firms with greater (less) marketing capabilities. 
 
4.2.2. Relative Marketing Strategic Emphasis. Strategic emphasis measures the spending 
by a firm on advertising versus R&D efforts, which, theoretically, captures the relative emphasis 
of the firm on value appropriation versus value creation activities (Mizik & Jacobson, 2003). 
R&D activities, captured by value creation, tend to be, on average, riskier than value-
appropriating advertising activities (Hauser et al., 2006). Institutional common owners can 




aversion resulting from their more diversified portfolios (Edmans et al., 2019) and ability to act 
as a conduit to link firms to work together on joint products, alliances, bundles, etc. (Connelly et 
al., 2018). Hence, institutional common owners’ capabilities and interests are likely to help firms 
with a value creating R&D focused strategic emphasis to gain from knowledge spillovers, a 
reduction of information asymmetries, and an increase in the likelihood of collaborative 
partnerships (Park et al., 2019). Further, institutional investors regularly engage, provide 
oversight, and opine on the firm’s R&D spending  (He & Huang, 2017). Thus, through their 
greater tolerance to and productivity of risk-taking activities and via engagement with executives 
with multiple firms in the same industry, we expect the gains in performance from common 
ownership to be greater for firms with a value creating R&D-focused strategic emphasis than for 
firms with a value appropriating advertising-focused strategic emphasis. This is despite firms 
with a value appropriating advertising focused strategic emphasis also potentially benefiting 
from institutional common ownership, in particular, due to potential bundling and joint 
advertising opportunities with other common owned firms. Therefore, we expect: 
H3: The positive effect of institutional common ownership on firm performance will be 
stronger for firms with a greater strategic emphasis on R&D over advertising efforts.  
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Data  
To empirically test our conceptual model, we employ data from various sources covering three 
decades (1986-2016) and comprising of 43,063,833 institutional common ownership holdings, 
7,998 institutional investors, and 22 NAICS industries. First, to obtain annual firm-level 
information, we merged data from Compustat, which provides annual 10-K-based firm-level 
information, with data from the Thompson Reuters 13f Summary Database, which reports firm-
level institutional ownership summary statistics. Any observations from industries with fewer 




institutional investor’s holdings from the Thomson Reuters s34 Institutional Investor Holdings 
Database. As our interest is only on institutions with a potential “voice” or influence in the firm, 
we restricted our data to institutions who own >1% of outstanding shares in a firm.3 Third, we 
constructed our institutional common ownership measure, described in the next sub-section. We 
maximized the number of firm observations per industry per year to construct this measure, 
which included observations from firms that had missing data on variables unrelated to the 
construction of the institutional common ownership measure. 
5.1.1. Focal Variable. Given the empirical context of our conceptual framework, our 
focal variable, institutional common ownership, needs to be both applicable to a diverse set of 
industries and allow for comparisons across and between industries. However, institutional 
common ownership metrics previously employed in the literature either rely on data from a 
single highly regulated industry, such as banking and airlines (e.g., Azar et al., 2018), or do not 
account for differences in individual firms’ extent of institutional common ownership, apart from 
the number of common owners or the sum of common ownership holdings in a firm (e.g., He & 
Huang, 2017). Therefore, we develop a new institutional common ownership metric that 
measures the average concentration of a firm’s institutional common owners’ holdings across an 
industry for a given year.  
To operationalize this measure, we broadly follow the operationalization of the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) measure. The reason is twofold. First, HHI is a widely 
employed measure for evaluating industry-level concentration and competition. Hence, the use 
                                                 
3 This is a conservative restriction in comparison to other commonly used cut-offs, such as a >5% ownership stake 
for blockholders, so that we can account for the majority of owners with sufficient stakes to influence firm behavior. 
Edmans and Holderness (2017, p. 542) describe that “there is no theoretical basis for the commonly used 5% 
threshold or indeed any threshold. Future research should study blocks below 5% when possible.”3 Further, in our 
interviews, the institutional common owners described that nearly all their engagements with firms is when they 
own 1-5% of the firm’s shares, and that institutional liquidity restraints often prevent them from owning >5% of 




of an HHI-type index for institutional common ownership provides a theoretical basis for the 
development of an institutional common ownership measure that relies on concentration of 
holdings by individual institutional investors across multiple firms in an industry. Second, the 
use of an HHI-type index for institutional common ownership enables us to measure the average 
concentration of a firm’s institutional common ownership holdings within and across an industry 
for a given year and allows us to examine comparisons of institutional common ownership over a 
large period of time. This measure ranges from 0 to 1, with greater (lower) numbers closer to one 
(zero) indicating that a firm’s average common owner has more dispersed (concentrated) market-
weighted holdings across their industry and greater (less) common ownership.  
The operationalization of the institutional common ownership measure involves the 
following seven steps for firm k in year t. In the first step, to assess the extent firm k is owned by 
institutional investor i, we calculate the percentage of shares of firm k each institutional investor i 





In the second step, we multiply 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑂𝑓𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐵𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑘𝑡 by the market value of firm k in year t 
to obtain the market-weighted value of institutional investor i's ownership stakes in firm k in year 
t.4  
(2) 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑂𝑓𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐵𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑘𝑡)(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑂𝑓𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑘𝑡) 
In the third step, to assess the overall holdings for institution i in industry l for year t, we sum the 
market-weighted value of shares owned by institution i across all firms in industry l for year t.  
                                                 
4 As a robustness test, we also calculated market-weighted values for institutional investor i's ownership stakes in 
firm k in year t by employing a variety of other financial variables, such as market share, sales, total assets, cash, 
and property, plant, and equipment. The results with these alternative financial metrics were similar to the market 
value-based metric. Thus, for the remainder of the paper, we only discuss the results of our market-value weighted 








In the fourth step, to find the market-weighted share of each institutional investor’s holdings 
relative to the institutional investor’s overall holdings in an industry, we divide the market-
weighted percentage of shares of firm k held by institutional investor i by the total market value 





In the fifth step, to assess the market-weighted dispersion of each individual institutional 
investor’s holdings across an industry, we compute a sum of squares concentration measure for 
each holding for each institution i in industry l for a given year t.  





In the sixth step, to calculate the average institutional common ownership per firm, we average 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑙𝑡 across all institutions who own firm k for a given year t. The 
resultant value provides an easy-to-compare firm-based measure that assesses the dispersion of 







In the last step, to assist in interpretation, we take one minus 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑘𝑡 so that larger 
numbers are associated with a greater extent of institutional common ownership.  
(7) 𝐶𝑜𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑘𝑡 = 1 − (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑘𝑡) 
The intuition behind our measure of institutional common ownership for each individual 
firm is that the measure should be low and closer to zero if the average institutional investor for a 
                                                 
5 We classify industries based on two-digit NAICS codes because it is the standard industry reporting that the U.S. 
government requires and was designed to replace the SIC industry classification system that had grown inconsistent 
in its classifications (https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/). Further, NAICS had better data availability than the 




given firm only holds ownership stakes in a small number of firms or are concentrated in a small 
number of firms. For example, Dynasil Corporation had an institutional common ownership 
score of zero in 2016 since it had only a single institutional investor that owned >1% of its shares 
for that year, Finemark National Bank & Trust, who did not own >1% of the shares of any other 
firm in Dynasil’s industry. In contrast, the measure of institutional common ownership should be 
greater and closer to one for a firm if the average institution holds shares in many firms in the 
industry and its market-weighted industry portfolio is highly diversified. Thus, Oshkosh 
Corporation had a near maximum institutional common score of 0.985 in 2015 since it had 16 
institutional investors that owned >1% of its shares, including BlackRock, Fidelity, and State 
Street, with each having highly dispersed market-weighted holdings. 
To establish theoretical and empirical validity of our proposed measure, we, first, found 
that institutional common owners in our interviews believed that a concentration-based measure 
that captured the market-value based holdings of firms was more representative than a tally of 
number of firms they held shares in the industry that did not account for the market-value of such 
holdings. Then, as an empirical test, we find that larger firms, which are typically listed on 
various indexes or ETFs such as the S&P 500 or Russell 1000 that generate a larger proportion 
of common owners (e.g., Edmans & Holderness, 2017), indeed have greater institutional 
common ownership scores. We further elaborate on this in the descriptive statistics section.  
5.1.2. Dependent Variable. We employ the firm’s return on assets (ROA) as our measure 
of performance, which is operationalized as earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation 
divided by total assets (e.g., Feng et al., 2015; Srinivasan et al., 2011). We focus on a firm’s 
accounting performance rather than its financial market performance due to the potential for 




ownership may have a direct effect on the stock return or price of a firm. However, as a 
robustness test, we also tested alternative financial measures of performance in Section 6.3.1. 
 5.1.3. Moderating Variables. Marketing capabilities are operationalized consistent with 
prior research via an input–output approach using stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) (e.g., 
Dutta et al., 1999). The SFE model estimates an inefficiency score based on the firm’s ability to 
transform its marketing inputs into sales outputs. Firms with smaller inefficiency scores have 
greater marketing capabilities. Following Swaminathan and Moorman (2009), we include (1) the 
installed base of customers (lagged firm sales), (2) firm resources devoted to the development of 
customer relationships (firm receivables), (3) overall marketing expenditures (sales, general, and 
administrative expenses), (4) advertising expenditures, and (5) R&D expenditures as the 
marketing input variables, and sales as the output variable for the model to estimate the firm’s 
marketing capabilities. To estimate this model, we estimate a Production Frontier Model with a 
nonnegative distribution component that is assumed to be from a half-normal distribution. We 
then compare the firm’s actual sales with the projected sales frontier to obtain an inefficiency 
score, which is the inverse of a firm’s marketing capabilities.6  
Relative strategic emphasis is operationalized consistent with prior literature as 
advertising expenditures minus R&D expenditures, divided by total assets (Han et al., 2017; 
Mizik & Jacobson, 2003).7 Hence, firms spending more on advertising activities than R&D 
                                                 
6 As two separate robustness tests, we estimated two marketing capabilities measures that (i) did not include R&D 
expenditures and (ii) was calculated by including industry-level dummy variables as an input in the SFE model. The 
focal results for models utilizing these alternative specifications of marketing capabilities were consistent with the 
results from the described specification (see Web Appendix Table 6). Thus, for simplicity, we proceed by only using 
the marketing capabilities measure described in the main text.  
7
 Empirically, we do not find much variation in marketing capabilities and strategic emphasis by industry. Thus, we 
do not include industry-dummies interacted with these moderators in our analysis. We also note that while 
advertising and R&D spending are part of the operationalization of both our marketing moderators, theoretically, 
marketing capabilities and strategic emphasis are two independent constructs since marketing capabilities measures 
the efficiency of marketing inputs in creating sales outputs, and SE measures how the firm relatively allocates its 




activities will have a greater strategic emphasis value, which indicates the firm is relatively 
emphasizing value-appropriating over value-creating activities. Further, we scale strategic 
emphasis by the firm’s total assets to minimize concerns that strategic emphasis may be 
confounded with the firm’s ROA.  
5.1.4. Control Variables. We also control for a variety of firm, industry, and institutional 
investor variables that may affect a firm’s performance. First, because institutional investors and 
institutional common owners could prefer certain firms and industries, we include the following 
three variables to account for such unobserved preferences and potential sources of endogeneity: 
(1) percentage of institutional ownership for a firm, (2) average percentage of institutional 
ownership for an industry, and (3) industry institutional common ownership. Second, we include 
controls for firm performance commonly employed in previous marketing–finance interface 
research, such as the firm’s size, financial leverage, industry competitive intensity, industry 
growth rate, and industry dynamism (e.g., Feng et al., 2015; Han et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2015). 
Third, to account for unobserved effects for a given year, we include dummy variables for each 
observation year. Finally, as described in the next sub-section, we control for additional firm and 
industry characteristics such as R&D pipeline, CEO’s industry experience, and CMO on the 
board that are time invariant or do not vary significantly over time by the nature of the model, 
which accounts for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We refer the reader to Table 2 for further 
details on each of our variables, their operationalizations, and literature sources. 
5.2. Statistical Model 
5.2.1. Model Overview. Given the strategic nature of the focal variables in our conceptual 
model, we must account for a number of empirical issues, such as endogeneity, reverse causality, 
                                                 
strategic emphasis as their correlation is r = .08. Finally, substantively, we observe a nearly equal split of low and 




unobserved heterogeneity, and potential persistence or inertia in decision-making and 
performance. However, finding appropriate instrumental variables (IVs) correlated with these 
variables but that do not have an effect on firm performance is difficult due to the endogeneity of 
our focal variables (e.g., see Rossi, 2014) and the lack of theory or knowledge on drivers of 
common ownership behavior (e.g., see Edmans & Holderness, 2017). Hence, consistent with 
prior research analyzing dynamic panel data in the marketing–finance interface literature (e.g., 
Feng et al., 2015; Mizik & Jacobson, 2009; Nezami et al., 2018), we estimate our model using 
the Arellano–Bond General Method of Moments (GMM) method. 
The Arellano-Bond GMM method utilizes first-differencing transformations, i.e., how 
changes in the independent variables affect changes in the dependent variables, to analyze 
dynamic panel data. The first-differencing transformations, like other methods of controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, controls for serial correlation (Ivanov et al., 2013) and accounts for 
static differences between firms, such as the industry in which the firm is classified (Tuli & 
Bharadwaj, 2009). The Arellano-Bond GMM also helps control for endogeneity and reverse 
causality (as detailed in section 5.2.2.) through the use of IVs created by lagging endogenous 
variables (Kirca et al., 2020; Xiong & Bharadwaj, 2013). Further, the Arellano-Bond GMM 
method computes valid asymptotic errors unlike other IV-based approaches like a control 
function (Rossi, 2014). Consequently, prior research in corporate finance identifies the Arellano-
Bond GMM method as an appropriate method to deal with a dynamic panel data structure that 
has an unbalanced set of panels, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous variables (Flannery 
& Hankins, 2013).  




(8) ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽1(∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(∆𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐸𝑚𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽4(∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1)(∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡−1)








5.2.2. Endogeneity. Despite accounting for the preferences of institutional investors for 
certain firms or industries via (i) the inclusion of several control variables and (ii) first-
differencing all of our focal and control variables to help account for unobserved heterogeneity 
and potential inertia and persistence in our focal variables, endogeneity may still be present in 
our analysis. For example, institutional common owners may have additional, unobserved, and 
unaccounted for investment knowledge about certain firms compared to all other institutions or 
investors, which could result in biased empirical estimates due to endogeneity. Thus, to control 
for such potential endogeneity, the Arellano–Bond GMM model allows for the creation of 
instrumental variables (IVs) based on the lagged values of first-differenced covariates, which are 
theoretically correlated with our variable of interest, but not the model’s error terms (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991; Xiong & Bharadwaj, 2013). In our model, we conservatively assume that all of our 
focal variables are endogenous. Hence, our approach results in theoretically valid IVs since it is 
unlikely that the error terms would be correlated with the instruments created using the lagged 
first-differenced variables, which prior research in the management-finance interface literature 
has suggested produces valid IVs to account for potential endogeneity in the ownership and firm 
performance context (Schultz et al., 2010). Thus, the remaining endogeneity in our analysis that 
may be persistent even after controlling for firm- and industry-specific unobserved heterogeneity 
and institutional investor preferences should be accounted for by using such lagged IVs.8  
  
                                                 
8 To further test the effect of industry-level unobservable effects, we estimated a model that included time-invariant 




5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Our final estimation sample contains 5,817 firm–year observations from 1,065 firms.9 In Table 2, 
we provide descriptive statistics. In Web Appendix Table 1, we provide a correlation matrix. The 
median firm in the sample has 3,900 employees and spends $9.5 million and $7.4 million on 
advertising and R&D, respectively.  
In Figure 2, we display how institutional investors’ percent of holdings steadily increases 
over three-decades of data from a low of 33.59% (in 1987) to a high of 72.11% (in 2015), apart 
from a small decrease during the Great Financial Crisis. On a firm–year observation level, we 
find the average firm in our sample has 8.5 institutional investors that own >1% shares of the 
firm, who, combined, own an average of 26.0% of the firm’s stock. The average firm-year 
observation has a common ownership measure of 0.968, with a standard deviation of 0.07, 
showing that institutional owners often engage in extensive common ownership, but the 
dispersion of common ownership varies by firm.  
In Web Appendix Table 2, we rank-order all 1,065 firms in our estimation sample based 
on their average extent of institutional common ownership over time. This table should be useful 
for public policymakers to examine which firms have the greatest and least extent of institutional 
common ownership, on average over time, based on an extensive collection of institutional 
holdings across a large number of firms and years. For example, we report the five firms with the 
greatest extent of common ownership are Empire Resorts Inc., Santa Barbara Restaurant Group, 
                                                 
9 The sample size was reduced from the initial sample employed to construct our institutional common ownership 
measure because we eliminated firms from our dataset that had missing data on one of our focal variables, and firms 
that did not have fully reported data for at least three consecutive years since our dynamic panel Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimation method requires lagged data to form instrumental variables to account for endogeneity. This 
greatly reduced our dataset as not every firm in Compustat reports all data employed for multiple years in a row. For 
example, not every firm the Compustat data is forced to report their advertising spending (a variable employed to 
compute our marketing strategic emphasis and marketing capability measures), and, in fact, previous reports have 
documented that less than half the firms in Compustat actually do report such spending (Han et al., 2017). In 




Allin Corp., H&H Oil Tool Co., and Audio King Corp. and the five firms with the lowest 
common ownership are Telkonet Inc., Dynasil Corp., Taitron Components, Lyris Inc., and 
Conversant Inc. 
Finally, in Web Appendix Table 3, we provide a comparison between firms with low and 
high institutional common ownership on key aspects. Interestingly, we do not find many 
differences between firms with low and high institutional common ownership, apart from firm 
size. These lack of differences are consistent with previous findings on institutional common 
ownership and large ownership blocks, which has described a lack of theory and knowledge on 
drivers of common ownership behavior other than larger firms are likely to have a greater 
prevalence of institutional owners (e.g., Edmans & Holderness, 2017).   
6. Results 
6.1 Model-Free Evidence 
In Figure 3, we provide model-free evidence to better understand the nature of the relationships 
between common ownership, marketing, and firm performance. To enable ease of understanding 
of model-free visual evidence, we average a variable’s score across a firm’s yearly observations 
and then take median splits for each of the focal variables to provide low and high measures. In 
Panel A of Figure 3, we observe that firms with high common ownership have slightly greater 
average ROA than firms with low common ownership. In Panel B of Figure 3, we observe a 
positive relationship between institutional common ownership and ROA for firms with low 
marketing capabilities and firms with high strategic emphasis, but not for firms with high 
marketing capabilities and low strategic emphasis. Taken together, this model-free evidence 
indicates that the effects of institutional common ownership are not uniform and instead may be 
contingent on moderators, such as the firm’s marketing capabilities and strategic emphasis. 




context, including reverse causality, endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and firm- and 
industry-level effects. As such, to better analyze the data, we estimate our Arellano-Bond GMM 
econometric model, the results of which we discuss next.  
6.2. Parameter Estimates 
In Table 3, we provide the results of the empirical analysis. To begin, we find that an increase in 
institutional common ownership is associated with an increase in firm performance (p<.01). 
Consequently, we find that institutional common ownership is related to better individual firm 
performance, which supports our expectation in H1. As a reminder, we include controls for the 
firm, industry, and economic setting as well as the percent of institutional ownership in a firm to 
ensure that our results are not due to an increase in overall institutional ownership. Further, we 
control for changes in an industry’s institutional common ownership, which helps account for 
institutions’ industry-level preferences. 
Next, we examine whether the relationship between a firm’s extent of institutional 
common ownership and its performance is moderated by its marketing capabilities and relative 
strategic emphasis, two measures that describe marketing at the strategic level. As expected, we 
find a negative interaction between institutional common ownership and marketing capabilities 
(p<.01), indicating that common ownership provides less (more) benefit to more (less) marketing 
capable firms. Hence, we find support for H2. We also find that an increase in institutional 
common ownership relates to superior performance in firms whose strategic emphasis is oriented 
more toward value-creating R&D over value-appropriating advertising activities (p<.01), 
providing support for H3. Combined, these marketing-related findings demonstrate that the 
relationship between institutional common ownership and firm performance can be impacted by 





6.3. Robustness Tests 
Table 4 provides a summary of motivation, results, and insights gained from variants of our focal 
analysis conducted as robustness tests. First, given that we develop a new measure of 
institutional common ownership in this research, we test the robustness of our results to four 
alternative institutional common ownership measures: (i) common ownership across the entire 
sample of firms, (ii) the absolute size of the firm to account for differences in investors’ attention 
towards larger firms (e.g., Ferreira & Matos, 2008), and by employing two of He and Huang's 
(2017) common ownership measures, i.e., (iii) the number of same-industry peers that share any 
common institutional owner with the firm and (iv) the sum of all common institutional owner 
percent holdings in the firm itself. We find statistical support for H1 and H2 when using each of 
these alternative institutional common ownership measures, and statistical support for H3 in the 
first two models.  
Second, we follow a “shoe-leather empirics” strategy, as recommended by Edmans and 
Holderness (2017) when empirically examining the effects of large stockholders on firm 
performance. This strategy involves examining whether our results are consistent when only 
testing subsets of the sample in which a firm’s strategic marketing is most likely to moderate the 
relationship between institutional common owners and firm performance. If we do not find 
support for our hypotheses in these sub-samples, our estimation and measures could appear 
biased or have validity issues. Therefore, we split the sample by firms that possess more or less 
than the median amount of (i) marketing capabilities and (ii) strategic emphasis, and by firms 




investment firms and (iv) considered to employ an active investment strategy.10 In each of the 
models employing subsets of our data, we find that the results for each of our hypotheses hold.  
 Third, we examine whether common ownership has similar effects on different measures 
of firm performance other than ROA. We employ three alternative performance measures to 
evaluate the robustness of our results: (i) sales (natural log-scaled), (ii) Tobin’s q, and (iii) 
market value. We find the results of H1 and H2 remain consistent with the focal model when 
employing each of the three alternative performance measures, but only find partial support for 
H3.  
Finally, to provide evidence that the results are not driven exclusively by the 
methodology and estimation technique used to test our hypotheses, we test our conceptual 
framework by employing an alternative control for endogeneity, specifically, a switching 
regression model (e.g., Cao & Sorescu, 2013). As discussed in detail in Web Appendix A, the 
switching regression model estimates two regression equations and a criterion function to control 
for endogeneity of a focal variable by using observed and unobserved factors to assign 
observations to each regression equation. In this analysis, we estimate two regression equations 
based on regimes determined by whether the observation is likely to be characterized by a high 
or low amount of common ownership. We find that the positive effect of institutional common 
owners on firm performance (H1) and the moderating effect of marketing capabilities on this 
relationship (H2) are both driven primarily by firms with lower levels of common ownership. In 
contrast, we find the moderating effect of strategic emphasis (H3) exists for common ownership 
at both high and low levels. The potential implications of these results to public policy are 
detailed in the Discussion section.  
                                                 





7. Additional Analysis on the Role of Firm Size 
An additional insight from our interviews with institutional common owners was that managers 
of smaller firms were more likely to seek and implement insights and industry best marketing 
and R&D practices in comparison to their larger competitors. For example, one institutional 
common owner described how smaller firms often aggressively sought advice on best practices 
to improve their productivity, including by seeking knowledge about competitor marketing 
efforts. Further, another institutional common owner described his role as a conduit linking his 
smaller firms with his other firms to collaboratively work on R&D projects and establish 
knowledge sharing of best practices.  
Prior literature also suggests that institutional investors often hold more clout in smaller 
firms’ decision making due to institutions’ punitive financial market repercussions to such firms 
if they sell their stakes (Brav et al., 2008). In addition, prior literature has found that smaller 
firms have more limited resources than larger firms (Wang et al., 2015), constraining smaller 
firms’ risk-taking abilities (González-Uribe, 2020) and access to external and internal networks 
of knowledge (Harmancioglu et al., 2010). Consequently, we provide exploratory analyses for 
whether firm size acts as an additional moderator of the relationships between institutional 
common ownership, marketing capabilities, strategic emphasis, and firm performance. Based on 
the theory and managerial insights noted above, we expect an increase in institutional common 
ownership to be associated with a greater increase in the performance of smaller over larger 
firms. In addition, we expect smaller firms to benefit more from common ownership if they have 
lower marketing capabilities and when they spend relatively more on value-creating R&D 
expenditures than on value-appropriating advertising expenditures.  
We test the potential moderating role of firm size via three methods. First, we add two-




based on two thresholds of firm size, i.e., the smallest 50% and 75% of firms. Third, we employ 
switching regressions that examine observations classified into two regimes based on expected 
small and large firm size, as an alternative method to account for potential endogeneity of firm 
size. We report the results of these analyses in Web Appendix Table 5. In the models that (i) 
examine subsets of data based on firm size and (ii) utilize switching regression models to 
account for endogeneity in firm size, we find that an increase in institutional common ownership 
is significantly associated with an increase in the performance of smaller but not larger firms. In 
addition, we find that an increase in institutional common ownership is significantly associated 
with an increase in the performance for firms with less marketing capabilities and with a 
strategic emphasis oriented toward value-creating R&D over value-appropriating advertising 
activities, again, only for smaller and not for larger firms, and these results are consistent across 
the different estimated models. Hence, we find smaller (larger) firms are more (less) likely to 
experience the positive benefits provided by institutional common ownership. This suggests that 
although smaller firms are less likely to have greater institutional common ownership (e.g., 
Edmans & Holderness, 2017), these firms offer a profitable opportunity for common owners to 
invest and provide performance-oriented-benefits.  
8. Discussion 
8.1. Managerial and Theoretical Implications 
Institutional common ownership has garnered interest and concern from regulators (e.g., Federal 
Trade Commission, 2018), the popular press (e.g., Authers, 2016), and academics (e.g., Azar et 
al., 2018). Despite this interest, to our knowledge, no research has heretofore examined how the 
nature and effectiveness of certain organizational functions and strategies, such as a firm’s 
marketing strategy, impacts the relationship between common ownership and firm performance. 




common owners and firm managers to examine how institutional common owners’ incentives 
and capabilities to influence firm managers are linked to firm performance and how this effect 
can differ in extent between firms characterized by varying marketing efficiency and allocation 
between advertising and R&D expenditures.  
Empirically, across a number of models and analyses, we find that an increase in 
institutional common ownership is associated with a positive, rather than a negative, effect on 
firm performance. Further, we find institutional common owners’ effect on performance is 
stronger for firms with lower marketing capabilities. We also find partial support that the 
positive relationship between institutional common ownership and firm performance is stronger 
for firms with a marketing strategic emphasis towards value-creating R&D expenditures rather 
than value appropriating advertising expenditures. Also, in our additional analysis, we find the 
empirical relationships between institutional common ownership, marketing capabilities, 
strategic emphasis, and firm performance are primarily driven by their effects on smaller firms. 
Taken together, these results demonstrate institutional common ownership can provide 
firm performance benefits to firms that are in greater need of common owners’ market 
knowledge, enabling of risk-taking, and ability to reduce barriers to collaboration (i.e., firms with 
less marketing capabilities, a strategic emphasis on value creation, and that are smaller). Hence, 
our results demonstrate that institutional common owners can provide positive consequences to 
their individual firms, which is in contrast to the negative consequences generally noted in the 
popular press (e.g., Posner et al., 2016). Further, our research provides evidence that regulators 
should consider how a firm’s extant strategic marketing can help determine whether institutional 
common owners provide positive or negative effects to their individual firms. As such, our 




strategy as not all of common owners’ consequences will be negative. Their consequences will, 
instead, be dependent on the firm’s functions and strategies, such as their extant marketing.  
8.2. Future Research and Limitations 
Future research is needed to expand beyond this first study in marketing to better 
understand the relationship between institutional common ownership and marketing. For 
example, the performance effects of common ownership documented in our research could be a 
function of institutional common owners providing their firms with better knowledge of 
consumers’ wants and needs, potentially increasing consumer welfare, or due to a variety of 
factors that can potentially harm consumer welfare, such as lower competitive intensity or 
avoidance of price wars between firms. Thus, the results documented in our research could come 
at the expense of consumer welfare or, in contrast, be beneficial for consumers by potentially 
improving the ability of firms to match offerings with consumer wants and needs. Further, less is 
known about how changes in the concentration of institutional common ownership affects 
employee compensation, informal and formal communication and projects with competitors, and 
vertical distribution channels. In addition, future research can examine the effect of institutional 
common ownership by including more fluid industry classification based on individual annual 
reports, such as via textual network industry classification (Hoberg et al., 2013). 
One follow-up question we explored is whether institutional common owners directly 
affect firms’ marketing efforts. We examined whether an increase in institutional common 
ownership directly affected advertising intensity, R&D intensity, strategic emphasis, marketing 
capabilities, and the inclusion of a marketer as a top management team executive (proxied as a 
top-five most paid employee). However, despite the likelihood of institutional common 
ownership directly affecting the marketing practices of individual firms, we did not find that 




contrast, we found that marketing has an indirect effect on the relationship between institutional 
common ownership and firm performance. Institutional common owners have a lesser ability to 
help firms that are producing better results with customers (i.e., better marketing capabilities) 
and spending more on value-appropriating advertising activities than value-creating R&D 
activities, as such firms are in less need of common owners’ knowledge of industry best practice, 
enabling of risk-taking, and ability to reduce barriers to collaboration. 
We also examined the relationship between institutional common owners, a firm’s extant 
marketing, and firm strategic activities like acquisitions, board interlocks, and corporate 
governance. In exploratory analysis using switching regression models to account for 
endogenous selection effects, we find the positive effects of institutional common ownership 
appear to be mostly associated with firms that are not engaging in acquisition behavior, but do 
not find evidence suggesting that board interlocks or corporate governance changes are related to 
the performance effects of common ownership or marketing’s moderating effect on this 
relationship. These results, which are summarized in Table 5, suggest that institutional common 
owners’ accumulated market knowledge and ability to reduce barriers of collaboration could 
serve as an alternative to firms relying on formal acquisitions. In addition, these results 
demonstrate how institutional common owners can benefit firms with fewer resources, such as 
those less likely to engage in acquisitions. 
Overall, the goal of our research was to introduce the concept of institutional common 
ownership to the marketing literature and establish that strategic marketing, as measured in this 
study by the firm’s marketing capabilities and strategic emphasis, can affect the relationship 
between institutional common ownership and firm performance. Further, our research identifies 
the importance of marketing as a moderator when analyzing the consequences of institutional 




assessing the possibility of regulations to address concerns about institutional common 
ownership. Specifically, firms characterized by less efficient marketing and value creation 
marketing strategies gain performance benefits from institutional common ownership, potentially 
creating more intense competition. As such, it is important for marketing researchers to continue 
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Table 1. Selected Published Papers on Common Ownership  
















Azar et al. (2018)  
   Common ownership is related to higher ticket prices in the airline industry, suggesting 
anti-competitive effects related to common ownership 
Cheung et al. (2020)  
   Common ownership is positively related to suppliers’ operating and market 
performance, especially for suppliers with greater dependence on buyers. 
Connelly et al. (2018)  
   Firms with common owners are more likely to compete with dissimilar competitive 
repertoires, and these dissimilarities have positive performance implications 
Elhauge (2020)  
 
 
 Common ownership in concentrated markets has anticompetitive effects and hence 
should be accounted for in M&A regulation decisions 
Faccio et al. (2011)  
   Firms with greater common ownership undertake riskier investments than firms with 
less common ownership 
Gilo et al. (2006)     Common ownership can impact the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion 
He & Huang (2017)     Common ownership may facilitate explicit forms of product market collaboration 
López & Vives (2018)  
   Common ownership leads to internalization of rivals’ profits by firms and increases 
output for high spillovers on R&D projects between firms 
O’Brien & Waehrer 
(2017)  
 
   
Common ownership is not found to have a significant effect on airline ticket prices 
Posner et al. (2017)     Proposes that anti-trust regulation is needed based on the size of common owners 
Edmans et al. (2019)  
 
 
  Common ownership influences corporate governance through voice and investor exit 
tactics 
He et al. (2019) 
 
 
  Common ownership is positively related to institutional owners' voting against 
management on shareholder-sponsored governance proposals  
Lin et al. (2018) 
 
 
  Common ownership is positively related to industry peers’ likelihood and frequency 
of issuing management forecasts 
Kang et al. (2018)     Common ownership is positively related to better corporate governance practices  
Park et al. (2019)     Common ownership is positively related to voluntary firm disclosures 
Fich et al. (2015)      Common ownership is positively related to acquisition deal completion 
Harford et al. (2011)     Common ownership has no significant effect on firm acquisition decisions 





Common ownership has no significant effect on acquisition outcomes and profits 
THIS PAPER 
   
 
Common ownership benefits the performance of firms with lower marketing 






Table 2. Operationalizations, Data and Literature Sources, and Descriptive Statistics of 
Variables 





Focal Variables      
Firm Performance 




Feng et al., (2015); 






For a given firm, the average 
dispersion (concentration) of 
their institutional investors’ 
holdings across an industry;  
see Section 5.1.1 











--- 0.97 0.07 
Marketing 
Capabilities 
Determined through SFE model 
which produces inefficiency 
score;  




Newmeyer et al.,  
(2016); Nguyen et 
al., (2020) 
0.98 0.08 
Strategic Emphasis  
(Advertising – R&D Expenses) / 
Total Assets 
Computed based on 
data from Compustat 
Mizik & Jacobson, 
(2003); Han et al., 
(2017) 
-0.01 0.10 
Control Variables      
Firm Institutional 
Owner Percentage  









Average firm institutional owner 
percentage per industry 
Computed based on 
merged datasets 




Average common ownership 
across an industry in a year 
Computed based on 
merged datasets 





Computed based on 
data from Compustat 
Feng et al., (2015) 0.04 0.06 
Financial Leverage  
(Debt in Current Liabilities  
+ Total Long-Term Debt) / 
Total Assets 
Compustat Han et al., (2017) 0.24 0.22 
Firm Size 
Number of employees, in 
thousands (natural log scaled) 
Compustat Han et al., (2017) 1.34 2.16 
Industry Growth 
Average rate of sales growth 
(annualized) between t − 2 and t 
Computed based on 
data from Compustat 
Wang et al., (2015) 0.06 0.08 
Industry 
Dynamism 
Absolute difference in the 
industry growth rate from t − 2 
to t − 1 versus from t − 1 to t 
Computed based on 
data from Compustat 
Wang et al., (2015) 0.19 0.12 






Table 3. Results of Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation 
Variable Coefficient Z-Score Sig. 
Intercept -2.49*** -2.94 .003 
Focal Variables    
Institutional Common Ownership  2.50*** 2.93 .003 
Marketing Capability  2.82*** 2.82 .873 
Strategic Emphasis  1.01* 1.85 .065 
Institutional Common Ownership x Marketing Capabilities -2.60*** -2.95 .003 
Institutional Common Ownership x Strategic Emphasis -3.16*** -5.80 .000 
Control Variables    
Lagged Performance  0.05*** 2.60 .009 
Institutional Ownership of Firm  0.31*** 10.14 .000 
Industry Institutional Ownership -0.04 -0.43 .668 
Industry Institutional Common Ownership -0.38*** -3.51 .000 
Competitive Intensity   0.28*** 2.82 .005 
Financial Leverage -0.02 -0.59 .557 
Industry Growth -0.04 -0.81 .418 
Industry Dynamism -0.03 -0.95 .342 
Ln(Firm Size)  0.01 1.35 .178 
Model Diagnostics    
χ2 1,137   






Table 4. Summary of Expected Effects and Results for Robustness Tests 
Robustness Test  
Motivation for Robustness Test Common 
Owner 
Common 
Owner x  
Mkt. Cap. 
Common 
Owner x  
Str. Emp. 
Insights from Robustness Test 
Hypothesis (Expected Effect) H1 (+) H2 (–) H3 (–) 
Focal Results ---    
Common ownership is positively associated with firm perf.; 
stronger effect for firms with lower marketing capab. and 
relative str. emp. oriented to R&D over advertising 
Alternative Specifications to Common Ownership Measure 
Entire Sample Common 
Ownership 
Common owners may benefit co-owned firms outside 
of industry; also, to test sensitivity of this measure to 
the usage of NAICS-based industry specification 
   
Common ownership provides benefits firms across and within 
industries  
Absolute Size of Firm 
Investors’ attention and preferences may be focused 
towards larger firms (e.g., Ferreira & Matos, 2008) 
   
Common ownership provides benefits to firms, even accounting 
for owners paying more attention to larger firms 
Number of Common 
Owners  
Alternative measure of common ownership employed 
by He & Huang (2017) 
  X 
Effect of common ownership and the moderating effect of 
marketing capab. are robust to these specifications of common 
ownership; Str. Emp. potentially insignificant due to the 
measure no longer being market-weighted, which can dilute 
common owners’ influence in firms 
Sum of Common Owners 
Holding in Firm 
Alternative measure of common ownership employed 
by He & Huang (2017) 
  X 




Common ownership is expected to benefit firm perf. for 
firms with lower marketing capabilities  
   
Common ownership provides greater benefits to firms with low 
marketing cap.; results also hold when only examining firms 
with high marketing capab. 
Low Strategic Emphasis 
(below median) 
Common ownership is expected to benefit firm perf. for 
firms with lower strategic emphasis 
   
Common ownership provides greater benefits to firms that 
spend more on R&D than advertising (low str. emp. emphasis); 
Results also hold when only examining firms with high 
marketing capab. 
Investment Firm 
Professional institutional common investment advisors 
provide unique benefits for firm perf. 
   Results hold when investigating solely the firms that have 
largest block of institutional common investors classified as (i) 
investment advisors and (ii) active investors 
Active Investment 
Strategies 
Active investor institutional common owners provide 
unique benefits for firm perf. (He & Huang, 2017) 
   
Alternative Measures of Performance 
Sales  
Examine whether common ownership affects other 
forms of firm perf. 
  X Str. Emp. does not impact common own.’s effect on firm sales 
Tobin’s q    Results hold when examining market value perf. 
Market value   X 
Investors may negatively value a strategy that emphasizes less 
R&D spending to develop breakthrough R&D-based 
innovations (e.g., Wies & Moorman, 2015) 
Alternative Model Specification to Account for Endogeneity 
Low Common Ownership 
(below median) Switching regression that controls for observed and 
unobserved factors driving common ownership 
   Greater common ownership provides benefits for firms with less 
common ownership, especially for firms with lower marketing 
capab. and strategically oriented towards value creation (R&D)  
High Common Ownership 
(above median) 
X X  




Table 5. Summary of Additional Analyses  
Focus of Analysis Motivation Empirical Test Method Result Insight(s) 
Firm Size     
Common Owner x  
Firm Size 
Common owners’ have more clout to influence 
small firms, which should increase likelihood of use 
of common owner’s recommendations  
Two-way interactions, 
switching regressions, and 
subsets of data based on 
firm size (smallest 50% and 
75% of firms) 
P 1) Smaller (larger) firms are more (less) likely 
to experience the positive benefits provided 
by institutional common ownership  
 
2) Smaller firms offer a profitable opportunity 
for common owners to invest and provide 
performance-oriented-benefits 
Common Owner x  
Mkt. Cap. x Firm 
Size 
The relative advantage of common ownership to 
firms with lower marketing capabilities will 
primarily occur in smaller firms 
Three-way interactions, 
switching regressions, and 
subsets of data based on 
firm size (smallest 50% and 
75% of firms) 
 
Common Owner  
x Str. Emp. x Firm 
Size  
The relative advantage of common ownership to 
firms with a relative strategic emphasis on value 
creation (R&D) will primarily occur in smaller firms 
 
Direct Effect of 
Common Ownership 
    
Ad. Intensity 
Common owners may directly affect a firm’s 
marketing efforts and strategies 
 
X 
No direct effect on firm practice documented 
R&D Intensity X 
Mkt. Cap. X 
Str. Emp. X 
Marketer as a top 5 
paid employee 
X 
Mediating Effect of 
Common Ownership 
    
Acquisitions 
Common ownership can help identify acquisition 
targets or negatively affect the need to engage in 
acquisitions (e.g., Matvos & Ostrovsky 2008) 
Switching regression 
models for each variable 
(yes/no) 
 
Institutional common owners’ accumulated 
market knowledge and ability to reduce barriers 
of collaboration could serve as an alternative to 
formal acquisitions 
Board Interlocks 
Common owned firms can help increase likelihood 
of board members on co-owned firms, which 
facilitates knowledge transfer and ability to 
collaborate (He & Huang, 2017) 
X 
No mediated effect on board interlocks or 
corporate governance documented 
Corporate 
Governance 
Common ownership improves corporate governance 
structure, which should increase firm performance 
(He et al., 2019; Kang et al., 2018) 
X 




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
 
  



































































































































































Figure 3. Model-Free Evidence 
 
Panel A. Model-Free Evidence of Direct Relationships  
 
 
Panel B. Model-Free Evidence of Interactions  
 
Note: The average ROA provided is the average of a variable’s score across all a firm’s yearly 
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Web Appendix A. Switching Regression 
In line with previous research (e.g., Cao and Sorescu 2013), we employ a switching regression model as 
an alternative method to account for potential observable and unobservable endogeneity (see Table 3). A 
switching regression model estimates two regression equations and a criterion function (Iit) that 
determines the regime of an observation. In our context, the criterion function describes whether the firm 
has relatively high or low institutional common ownership. 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 0    if  γ𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 ≤ 0 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1    if  γ𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 > 0 
Regime 1: 𝑅𝑂𝐴1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖1𝑖𝑡         if 𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 0 
Regime 2: 𝑅𝑂𝐴2𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖2𝑖𝑡          if 𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1 
Iit is formed utilizing both observable and unobservable factors. γ is a vector of parameters capturing the 
relationship between observed variables and regime. The observable variables used to estimate the 
criterion function (X) are the number of firms in the industry, institutional ownership in the industry, the 
market value of the firm, the number of common shares outstanding, financial leverage, and firm size. 𝑢𝑖 
is an error term that captures unobservable factors beyond these that might influence an observation’s 
regime. 
Two regression models are determined based upon the criterion function, which measures 
whether an observation has higher or lower than median institutional common ownership measure. 𝛽1 and 
𝛽2 are vectors of parameters capturing the relationship between observable factors for each observation in 
each regime with the firm’s return-on-assets. The included variables (Z) match our focal and control 
variables with the exception of the observation year variables.  
We find that the positive effect of institutional common owners on firm performance (H1) and the 
moderating effect of marketing capability on this relationship (H2) are both driven primarily by firms 
with lower levels of common ownership (Regime 1). In contrast, we find the moderating effect of 










Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ROA (1) 1          
  
Common Own (2) 
.03 
(.03) 
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Web Appendix Table 2. Firms with Greatest Institutional Common Ownership Rank-
Ordered  
Note: Institutional Common Ownership scores are averaged across all observations of the firm in the 
dataset 
Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
1 EMPIRE RESORTS INC NYNY 32 INSIGNIA SYSTEMS INC ISIG 
2 SANTA BARBARA RESTAURANT 
GRP 
SBRG 33 DESIGN WITHIN REACH INC DWRI 
3 ALLIN CORP ALLN 34 U S VISION INC USVI 
4 H & H OIL TOOL CO HHOT 35 QMED INC QMED 
5 AUDIO KING CORP AUDK 36 TEXAS ROADHOUSE INC TXRH 
6 STEN CORP STEN 37 LADY LUCK GAMING CORP LUCK 
7 POLLO TROPICAL INC POYO 38 SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGIES INC STIZ 
8 DAKOTAH INC DKTH 39 INSIGHT ENTERPRISES INC NSIT 
9 INITIO INC INTO 40 MONSANTO CO MON 
10 FLANIGANS ENTERPRISES INC BDL 41 ADSTAR INC ADST 
11 GOOD TIMES RESTAURANTS INC GTIM 42 CALAVO GROWERS INC CVGW 
12 OCEAN OPTIQUE DISTRIBUTORS OPTQ 43 UNICOMP INC UCMP 
13 INTERCIM CORP ITCM 44 UNITED NATURAL FOODS INC UNFI 
14 NYER MEDICAL GROUP INC NYER 45 AMERICAN MEDICAL TECHNOL 
INC 
ADLI 
15 COFFEE PEOPLE INC MOKA 46 INVENTURE FOODS INC SNAK 
16 CLEAN ENERGY FUELS CORP CLNE 47 GALLERY OF HISTORY INC HIST 
17 EINSTEIN NOAH RESTAURANT 
GRP 
BAGL 48 MEDIA SCIENCES INTL INC MSII 
18 CALLOWAY'S NURSERY INC CLWY 49 CENTRAL TRACTOR FARM & 
CTRY 
CTFC 
19 BACK YARD BURGERS INC BYBI 50 HOLIDAY RV SUPERSTORES INC RVEE 
20 ASA INTERNATIONAL LTD ASAL 51 NYFIX INC NYFX 
21 SHOLODGE INC LODG 52 MAKEMUSIC INC MMUS 
22 QUALITY DINING INC QDIN 53 NATROL INC NTOL 
23 PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL 
CORP 
PRXL 54 GUITAR CENTER INC GTRC 
24 BOOMTOWN INC BMTN 55 CASINO MAGIC CORP CMAG 
25 INTRAWARE INC ITRA 56 POOL CORP POOL 
26 CAMPO ELECTRS APPLIAN & 
COMP 
CMPO 57 WESTERBEKE CORP WTBK 
27 FEIHE INTERNATIONAL INC ADY 58 ZUMIEZ INC ZUMZ 
28 BUCA INC BUCA 59 CHECKFREE CORP CKFR 
29 NETSUITE INC N 60 WALMART INC WMT 
30 BULL RUN CORP BULL 61 FIRST YEARS INC KIDD 
31 AMN HEALTHCARE SERVICES 
INC 




Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
63 MESA LABORATORIES INC MLAB 96 UNIFI INC UFI 
64 ROADHOUSE GRILL INC GRLL 97 GTECH HOLDINGS CORP GTK 
65 NASH FINCH CO NAFC 98 ESCALON MEDICAL CORP ESMC 
66 RITE AID CORP RAD 99 EATERIES INC EATS 
67 INTRICON CORP IIN 100 SYNERGX SYSTEMS INC SYNX 
68 MSC INDUSTRIAL DIRECT  -CL A MSM 101 M/I HOMES INC MHO 
69 NORDSTROM INC JWN 102 KOS PHARMACEUTICALS INC KOSP 
70 AVADO BRANDS INC AVDO 103 PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP PPC 
71 J & J SNACK FOODS CORP JJSF 104 VIASAT INC VSAT 
72 MACY'S INC M 105 STARBUCKS CORP SBUX 
73 DECKERS OUTDOOR CORP DECK 106 POSSIS MEDICAL INC POSS 
74 MANOR CARE INC HCR 107 ASPECT MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC ASPM 
75 GSI COMMERCE INC GSIC 108 LANNETT CO INC LCI 
76 AKSYS LTD AKSY 109 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 
AMERICA 
MSAI 
77 LANDEC CORP LNDC 110 STAR BUFFET INC STRZ 
78 CATASYS INC CATS 111 COMPUTRAC INC LLB 
79 DIANON SYSTEMS INC DIAN 112 TALEO CORP TLEO 
80 APPLIANCE RECYCLING CTR 
AMER 
ARCI 113 SPEECHWORKS INTL INC SPWX 
81 BIOMEDICAL DYNAMICS CORP BMDC 114 NATURE VISION INC NRVN 
82 CLICK COMMERCE INC CKCM 115 OMNI FILMS INTL INC OFII 
83 CONSILIUM INC CSIM 116 DEALERTRACK TECHNOLOGIES 
INC 
TRAK 
84 CHOICE HOTELS INTL INC CHH 117 MEDICAL ACTION INDUSTRIES MDCI 
85 SIRIUS XM HOLDINGS INC SIRI 118 AMERISTAR CASINOS INC ASCA 
86 AT&T INC T 119 RADIANT SYSTEMS INC RADS 
87 TENFOLD CORP TENF 120 FAIR ISAAC CORP FICO 
88 VALID LOGIC SYSTEMS INC VLID 121 DEAN FOODS CO DF 
89 BRAVO BRIO RESTAURANT GP 
INC 
BBRG 122 VERTICAL COMMUNICATIONS 
INC 
VRCC 
90 STEELCLOUD INC SCLD 123 MEDASSETS INC MDAS 
91 WRIGLEY (WM) JR CO WWY 124 COMPUCHEM CORP CCEM 
92 MICHAELS COS INC MIK 125 BIG 5 SPORTING GOODS CORP BGFV 
93 REYNOLDS AMERICAN INC RAI 126 NU HORIZONS ELECTRONICS 
CORP 
NUHC 
94 IMMUNOMEDICS INC IMMU 127 CCUR HOLDINGS INC CCUR 
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129 VENTREX LABORATORIES INC VTRX 161 ENTRUST INC ENTU 
130 DENDRITE INTERNATIONAL INC DRTE 162 NABISCO HOLDINGS CORP  -CL A NA 
131 CLINICAL DATA INC CLDA 163 HUFFMAN KOOS INC HUFK 
132 PACKETEER INC PKTR 164 SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING INC SRZ 
133 PEDIATRIC SVCS AMERICA INC PSAI 165 ADV NEUROMODULATION SYS 
INC 
ANSI 
134 ONYX SOFTWARE CORP ONXS 166 HARRIS INTERACTIVE INC HPOL 
135 APPLIX INC APLX 167 BRINKER INTL INC EAT 
136 RIGHTNOW TECHNOLOGIES INC RNOW 168 COVER-ALL TECHNOLOGIES INC COVR 
137 BALTEK CORP BTEK 169 KAISER ALUMINUM CORP KALU 
138 ENCORE MEDICAL CORP ENMC 170 ENZO BIOCHEM INC ENZ 
139 HP INC HPQ 171 BRITE VOICE SYSTEMS INC BVSI 
140 ICAD INC ICAD 172 WEST MARINE INC WMAR 
141 ROBINSON NUGENT INC RNIC 173 EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
CORP 
EDUC 
142 CORIO INC CRIO 174 OPTICAL CABLE CORP OCC 
143 UNO RESTAURANT CORP UNO 175 DILLARDS INC  -CL A DDS 
144 NANOPHASE TECHNOLOGIES 
CORP 
NANX 176 MEASUREMENT SPECIALTIES 
INC 
MEAS 
145 ASBURY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP 
INC 
ABG 177 PORTEC RAIL PRODUCTS INC PRPX 
146 AROTECH CORP ARTX 178 GRIFFON CORP GFF 
147 LASERCARD CORP LCRD 179 ATS MEDICAL INC ATSI 
148 ACCO BRANDS CORP ACCO 180 LINCOLN ELECTRIC HLDGS INC LECO 
149 SHUTTERFLY INC SFLY 181 HAWK CORP HWK 
150 YONGYE INTERNATIONAL INC YONG 182 SOCKET MOBILE INC SCKT 
151 GRAINGER (W W) INC GWW 183 NEUSTAR INC NSR 
152 MANNATECH INC MTEX 184 ROSS SYSTEMS INC ROSS 
153 INTL BUSINESS MACHINES 
CORP 
IBM 185 SRTI BLOCKCHAIN GEN INC SRTI 
154 CA INC CA 186 PAPA JOHNS INTERNATIONAL 
INC 
PZZA 
155 GANTOS INC GTOS 187 SPIRE CORP SPIR 
156 IMAGE SENSING SYSTEMS INC ISNS 188 GENESCO INC GCO 
157 WYETH WYE 189 DESTINATION MATERNITY CORP DEST 
158 DOLBY LABORATORIES INC DLB 190 BIOGEN INC BIIB 
159 SPSS INC SPSS 191 ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC ATVI 
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Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
193 GENENTECH INC DNA 227 ACUITY BRANDS INC AYI 
194 CYBEX INTERNATIONAL INC CYBI 228 CONFERTECH INTERNATIONAL 
INC 
CFER 
195 RELIV INTERNATIONAL INC RELV 229 NESS TECHNOLOGIES INC NSTC 
196 TYSON FOODS INC  -CL A TSN 230 CVS HEALTH CORP CVS 
197 ZALE CORP ZLC 231 THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC TMO 
198 FORT JAMES CORP FJ 232 CARDIODYNAMICS INTL CORP CDIC 
199 BRUKER CORP BRKR 233 MENTOR GRAPHICS CORP MENT 
200 HEALTH GRADES INC HGRD 234 SILICONIX INC SILI 
201 ADOBE INC ADBE 235 SUBARU OF AMERICA SBRU 
202 NEUROMETRIX INC NURO 236 CAMBEX CORP CBEX 
203 ALEXANDER'S INC ALX 237 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC TXN 
204 LIQUI-BOX CORP LIQB 238 NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CORP NATI 
205 NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL 
CORP 
NAV 239 TESLA INC TSLA 
206 INTUIT INC INTU 240 NYNEX CORP NYN 
207 SILICON LABORATORIES INC SLAB 241 DAMON BIOTECH INC DBIO 
208 ADVANCED LOGIC RESEARCH 
INC 
AALR 242 II-VI INC IIVI 
209 ZIX CORP ZIXI 243 JUNIPER NETWORKS INC JNPR 
210 HANESBRANDS INC HBI 244 NATIONAL RECORD MART INC NRMI 
211 CONNECTINC.COM CO CNKT 245 KENEXA CORP KNXA 
212 STARWOOD HOTELS&RESORTS 
WRLD 
HOT 246 MWI VETERINARY SUPPLY MWIV 
213 QUANTUM CORP QTM 247 MAXTOR CORP MXO 
214 PENNEY (J C) CO JCP 248 BIOWHITTAKER INC BWI 
215 SONIC AUTOMOTIVE INC  -CL A SAH 249 WIRELESS TELECOM GROUP INC WTT 
216 CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL INC CMG 250 PHOTON DYNAMICS INC PHTN 
217 GENERAL MILLS INC GIS 251 O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE INC ORLY 
218 SL INDUSTRIES INC SLI 252 TRACTOR SUPPLY CO TSCO 
219 DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC DRI 253 HORMEL FOODS CORP HRL 
220 CHICOS FAS INC CHS 254 SCS/COMPUTE INC SCOM 
221 TIME WARNER INC TWX 255 CISCO SYSTEMS INC CSCO 
222 CONAGRA BRANDS INC CAG 256 MARINEMAX INC HZO 
223 CROWN ANDERSEN INC CRAN 257 US AUTO PARTS NETWORK INC PRTS 
224 CABOT MEDICAL CORP CBOT 258 SUPERVALU INC SVU 
225 BIO-TECHNE CORP TECH 259 BOOLE & BABBAGE INC BOOL 





Rank Company Name Ticker 
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261 ANDERSONS INC ANDE 296 QUEST SOFTWARE INC QSFT 
262 RITA MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC RITA 297 POKERTEK INC PTEK 
263 PANTRY INC PTRY 298 MICROS SYSTEMS INC MCRS 
264 RESOUND CORP RSND 299 O'CHARLEY'S INC CHUX 
265 SEMTECH CORP SMTC 300 DIEBOLD NIXDORF INC DBD 
266 AUTOZONE INC AZO 301 OFFICEMAX INC OMX 
267 EBIX INC EBIX 302 METROPOLITAN HLTH NTWRKS 
INC 
MDF 
268 TUPPERWARE BRANDS CORP TUP 303 INTEL CORP INTC 
269 POLARIS INDUSTRIES INC PII 304 INVACARE CORP IVC 
270 NATIONAL EDUCATION CORP NEC 305 SIMPSON MANUFACTURING INC SSD 
271 ABERCROMBIE & FITCH  -CL A ANF 306 VITRIA TECHNOLOGY INC VITR 
272 BARNES & NOBLE INC BKS 307 EZCORP INC  -CL A EZPW 
273 FEATHERLITE INC FTHR 308 ZHONGPIN INC HOGS 
274 LIFECORE BIOMEDICAL INC LCBM 309 HEALTHSTREAM INC HSTM 
275 MERCK & CO MRK 310 DOVER CORP DOV 
276 VARIAN INC VARI 311 ARROW INTERNATIONAL INC ARRO 
277 NVIDIA CORP NVDA 312 OPSWARE INC OPSW 
278 CHART INDUSTRIES INC GTLS 313 JONES SODA CO JSDA 
279 NEWELL BRANDS INC NWL 314 CUNO INC CUNO 
280 NU SKIN ENTERPRISES  -CL A NUS 315 RAMTRON INTERNATIONAL 
CORP 
RMTR 
281 KOHL'S CORP KSS 316 K-TRON INTERNATIONAL INC KTII 
282 APOGENT TECHNOLOGIES INC AOT 317 MCCORMICK & CO INC MKC 
283 CALIPER LIFE SCIENCES INC CALP 318 LAUDER (ESTEE) COS INC -CL A EL 
284 CSK AUTO CORP CAO 319 EXACT SCIENCES CORP EXAS 
285 TALBOTS INC TLB 320 EDELBROCK CORP EDEL 
286 G-III APPAREL GROUP LTD GIII 321 PHARMACEUTICAL PROD DEV 
INC 
PPDI 
287 TIMBERLINE SOFTWARE CORP TMBS 322 UNITED ONLINE INC UNTD 
288 NACCO INDUSTRIES  -CL A NC 323 AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING ADP 
289 CALGENE INC CGNE 324 PEPSICO INC PEP 
290 99 CENTS ONLY STORES NDN 325 LUMINEX CORP LMNX 
291 FTI CONSULTING INC FCN 326 TITAN MACHINERY INC TITN 
292 PCTEL INC PCTI 327 24/7 REAL MEDIA INC TFSM 
293 DICKS SPORTING GOODS INC DKS 328 ABBOTT LABORATORIES ABT 
294 HEADWATERS INC HW 329 RATIONAL SOFTWARE CORP RATL 
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331 HARMONIC INC HLIT 364 NCR CORP NCR 
332 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP INC HAIN 365 BALLY ENTERTAINMENT CORP BLY 
333 PFIZER INC PFE 366 TELECOMMUNICATION SYS INC TSYS 
334 SONIC CORP SONC 367 MEDIMMUNE INC MEDI 
335 WOLOHAN LUMBER CO WLHN 368 ALTRA INDUSTRIAL MOTION 
CORP 
AIMC 
336 NIKE INC NKE 369 APPLE INC AAPL 
337 TELEBIT CORP TBIT 370 KIRSCHNER MEDICAL CORP KMDC 
338 MGP INGREDIENTS INC MGPI 371 CHATTEM INC CHTT 
339 CHRISTOPHER & BANKS CORP CBK 372 OFFICE DEPOT INC ODP 
340 OVERLAND STORAGE INC OVRL 373 GOLDN VALLEY MICROWAV GVF 
341 SIEBEL SYSTEMS INC SEBL 374 DIAMOND MULTIMEDIA SYS INC DIMD 
342 MICROSOFT CORP MSFT 375 TEMPUR SEALY INTL INC TPX 
343 INFORMATION RESOURCES INC IRIC 376 BORLAND SOFTWARE CORP BORL 
344 VERIFONE SYSTEMS INC PAY 377 PENNZOIL-QUAKER STATE CO PZL 
345 JLG INDUSTRIES INC JLG 378 ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS ITW 
346 EVANS INC EVAN 379 ONESOURCE INFORMATION 
SVCS 
ONES 
347 ASSISTED LIVING CONCEPTS 
INC 
ALC 380 ELANTEC SEMICONDUCTOR INC ELNT 
348 M & F WORLDWIDE CORP MFW 381 EMC CORP/MA EMC 
349 IMMERSION CORP IMMR 382 MICRODYNE CORP MCDY 
350 SIRONA DENTAL SYSTEMS INC SIRO 383 ADVANCED DIGITAL INFO CORP ADIC 
351 HARLEY-DAVIDSON INC HOG 384 GAP INC GPS 
352 ORTHOFIX MEDICAL INC OFIX 385 INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEMS ISSX 
353 GENERAL MOTORS CO GM 386 VISTEON CORP VC 
354 ITERIS INC ITI 387 RAINBOW TECHNOLOGIES INC RNBO 
355 ALIGN TECHNOLOGY INC ALGN 388 NANOMETRICS INC NANO 
356 NORDSON CORP NDSN 389 COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO CTB 
357 MEDIWARE INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 
MEDW 390 INTERTAN INC ITN 
358 MILLENNIUM 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
MLNM 391 REEBOK INTERNATIONAL LTD RBK 
359 RESPIRONICS INC RESP 392 AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTMS 
HLDS 
AMMD 
360 C-COR INC CCBL 393 COLE NATIONAL CORP CNJ 
361 DEI HOLDINGS INC DEIX 394 BEST BUY CO INC BBY 
362 ANALOGIC CORP ALOG 395 AMERICAN VANGUARD CORP AVD 
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397 COMPX INTERNATIONAL INC CIX 429 CAVIUM INC CAVM 
398 IDEXX LABS INC IDXX 430 HACH CO HACH 
399 PRESSTEK INC PRST 431 BOSTON ACOUSTICS INC BOSA 
400 CHURCH & DWIGHT INC CHD 432 FOOT LOCKER INC FL 
401 SIZZLER RESTAURANTS INTL 
INC 
SIZZ 433 FIRSTCASH INC FCFS 
402 EPICOR SOFTWARE CORP -OLD EPIC 434 TUESDAY MORNING CORP TUES 
403 SONO-TEK CORP SOTK 435 CRYOLIFE INC CRY 
404 TENNANT CO TNC 436 GEHL CO GEHL 
405 SMUCKER (JM) CO SJM 437 CASH AMERICA INTL INC CSH 
406 SPECTRALINK CORP SLNK 438 VOCUS INC VOCS 
407 SUPPORT.COM INC SPRT 439 MEDICIS PHARMACEUT CP  -CL 
A 
MRX 
408 AMISTAR CORP AMTA 440 JACUZZI BRANDS INC JJZ 
409 BRIGGS & STRATTON BGG 441 CINCINNATI MICROWAVE INC CNMW 
410 TRIMBLE INC TRMB 442 FISCHER IMAGING CORP FIMG 
411 LONGS DRUG STORES CORP LDG 443 COLFAX CORP CFX 
412 SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO SHW 444 RELM COMMUNICATIONS RGCY 
413 IGO CORP IGOC 445 FINISAR CORP FNSR 
414 BED BATH & BEYOND INC BBBY 446 VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP VG 
415 KROGER CO KR 447 TECNOL MEDICAL PRODUCTS 
INC 
TCNL 
416 CECO ENVIRONMENTAL CORP CECE 448 SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC SII 
417 AGILYSYS INC AGYS 449 TRANS WORLD CORP/NV TWOC 
418 TIBCO SOFTWARE INC TIBX 450 GRAPHIC SCANNING CORP GSCC 
419 CASCADE MICROTECH INC CSCD 451 ALMOST FAMILY INC AFAM 
420 QUIDEL CORP QDEL 452 COSINE COMMUNICATIONS INC COSN 
421 NOVELL INC NOVL 453 PREFORMED LINE PRODUCTS CO PLPC 
422 SCICLONE PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 
SCLN 454 WARNER-LAMBERT CO WLA 
423 ASTEC INDUSTRIES INC ASTE 455 SUN COMMUNITIES INC SUI 
424 CLOROX CO/DE CLX 456 SNAP-ON INC SNA 
425 NET2PHONE INC NTOP 457 CADENCE PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 
CADX 
426 AVON PRODUCTS AVP 458 SONIC FOUNDRY INC SOFO 
427 BEAM INC BEAM 459 MANPOWERGROUP MAN 
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461 RAE SYSTEMS INC RAE 493 FRISCH'S RESTAURANTS INC FRS 
462 AUTONATION INC AN 494 NETSCOUT SYSTEMS INC NTCT 
463 ASK JEEVES INC ASKJ 495 BOYD GAMING CORP BYD 
464 HAVERTY FURNITURE HVT 496 X-RITE INC XRIT 
465 LOWE'S COMPANIES INC LOW 497 HEMAGEN DIAGNOSTICS INC HMGN 
466 PMFG INC PMFG 498 SANGSTAT MEDICAL CORP SANG 
467 AMEDISYS INC AMED 499 SPARTANNASH CO SPTN 
468 ADE CORP/MA ADEX 500 SCHERING-PLOUGH SGP 
469 BROOKTREE CORP BTRE 501 COLLECTIVE BRANDS INC PSS 
470 PPG INDUSTRIES INC PPG 502 WENDY'S CO WEN 
471 MALLINCKRODT INC MKG 503 EMCEE BROADCAST PRODUCTS 
INC 
ECIN 
472 STANLEY BLACK & DECKER INC SWK 504 OAKLEY INC OO 
473 PROGRESS SOFTWARE CORP PRGS 505 QUIXOTE CORP QUIX 
474 DENNYS CORP DENN 506 APOGEE ENTERPRISES INC APOG 
475 MUELLER WATER PRODUCTS 
INC 
MWA 507 AVANEX CORP AVNX 
476 DOT HILL SYSTEMS CORP HILL 508 LIONBRIDGE TECHNOLOGIES 
INC 
LIOX 
477 VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 
VRTX 509 MICRONETICS INC NOIZ 
478 LENNOX INTERNATIONAL INC LII 510 TARGET CORP TGT 
479 TAYLOR DEVICES INC TAYD 511 PLATO LEARNING INC TUTR 
480 FUTURE NOW INC FNOW 512 SYMANTEC CORP SYMC 
481 GT BICYCLES INC GTBX 513 DOCUCORP INTERNATIONAL INC DOCC 
482 WINMARK CORP WINA 514 CIPRICO INC CPCI 
483 DIGILOG INC DILO 515 ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INC 
ADCT 
484 LAMSON & SESSIONS CO LMS 516 AMAZON.COM INC AMZN 
485 GILEAD SCIENCES INC GILD 517 KOSS CORP KOSS 
486 PHYSICIANS FORMULA 
HOLDINGS 
FACE 518 PGT INNOVATIONS INC PGTI 
487 GAIA INC GAIA 519 SEEBEYOND TECHNOLOGY 
CORP 
SBYN 
488 LEXMARK INTL INC  -CL A LXK 520 E COM VENTURES INC ECMV 
489 SEAWAY FOOD TOWN INC SEWY 521 TSI INC/MN TSII 
490 CREDENCE SYSTEMS CORP CMOS 522 SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO CO SMG 
491 MARGAUX INC MRGX 523 MOTORCAR PARTS OF AMER INC MPAA 
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525 RHONE-POULENC RORER RPR 559 MICROSTRATEGY INC MSTR 
526 MADDEN STEVEN LTD SHOO 560 MILLER (HERMAN) INC MLHR 
527 LITHIA MOTORS INC  -CL A LAD 561 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES AMD 
528 INKTOMI CORP INKT 562 HOME DEPOT INC HD 
529 TRIMAS CORP TRS 563 ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CP  -CL A ZBRA 
530 MONARCH CASINO & RESORT 
INC 
MCRI 564 CIRRUS LOGIC INC CRUS 
531 MERCURY SYSTEMS INC MRCY 565 GRAND UNION CO GUCO 
532 CHAMPION PARTS INC CREB 566 ARIBA INC ARBA 
533 TRC COS INC TRR 567 SAKS INC SKS 
534 OIL DRI CORP AMERICA ODC 568 LOTSOFF CORP LOTS 
535 ALTRIA GROUP INC MO 569 PIER 1 IMPORTS INC/DE PIR 
536 ADVANCE AUTO PARTS INC AAP 570 BLACKBOARD INC BBBB 
537 FEI CO FEIC 571 SIMON PROPERTY GROUP INC SPG 
538 MICREL INC MCRL 572 DEERE & CO DE 
539 K2 INC KTO 573 TERAYON COMMUN SYSTEMS 
INC 
TERN 
540 CHINA SECURITY & SURV TECH CSR 574 SUN TV & APPLIANCES INC SNTV 
541 SERACARE LIFE SCIENCES INC SRLS 575 SKECHERS U S A INC SKX 
542 EMS TECHNOLOGIES INC ELMG 576 ILC TECHNOLOGY INC ILCT 
543 FONAR CORP FONR 577 STEIN MART INC SMRT 
544 WHIRLPOOL CORP WHR 578 WAVO CORP WAVO 
545 CENTURY CASINOS INC CNTY 579 ENERGY RECOVERY INC ERII 
546 EVOLVING SYSTEMS INC EVOL 580 NOVAVAX INC NVAX 
547 UNISYS CORP UIS 581 WILMAR INDUSTRIES INC WLMR 
548 ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS INC ISLE 582 TANGER FACTORY OUTLET 
CTRS 
SKT 
549 CONN'S INC CONN 583 RALLYS HAMBURGERS INC RLLY 
550 WONDER AUTO TECHNOLOGY 
INC 
WATG 584 YUM BRANDS INC YUM 
551 SANDISK CORP SNDK 585 ASHLAND GLOBAL HOLDINGS 
INC 
ASH 
552 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO BMY 586 NITROMED INC NTMD 
553 REALPAGE INC RP 587 PACTIV CORP PTV 
554 ECOLLEGE.COM ECLG 588 INNOVEX INC INVX 
555 UNITED-GUARDIAN INC UG 589 GENERAC HOLDINGS INC GNRC 
556 BOTTOMLINE TECHNOLOGIES 
INC 
EPAY 590 FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS INTL INC FSI 
557 BEBE STORES INC BEBE 591 MAXIM INTEGRATED PRODUCTS MXIM 
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593 ORBIT INTERNATIONAL CORP ORBT 626 SOUTHWALL TECHNOLOGIES SWTX 
594 OSI RESTAURANT PARTNERS 
INC 
OSI 627 HASBRO INC HAS 
595 ASHTON-TATE CO TATE 628 BROCADE COMMUNICATIONS 
SYS 
BRCD 
596 RPM INTERNATIONAL INC RPM 629 ANGIODYNAMICS INC ANGO 
597 SMITH (A O) CORP AOS 630 WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC WSM 
598 AMGEN INC AMGN 631 FEDERAL-MOGUL HOLDINGS 
CORP 
FDML 
599 ESCALADE INC ESCA 632 RALCORP HOLDINGS INC RAH 
600 BOOKS-A-MILLION INC BAMM 633 NEENAH PAPER INC NP 
601 AGCO CORP AGCO 634 TEKELEC TKLC 
602 STAAR SURGICAL CO STAA 635 CHECKMATE ELECTRS INC CMEL 
603 NETOPIA INC NTPA 636 3M CO MMM 
604 CHIPCOM CORP CHPM 637 SCHEIN (HENRY) INC HSIC 
605 MINNETONKA CORP MINL 638 GIGA-TRONICS INC GIGA 
606 MONOTYPE IMAGING 
HOLDINGS 
TYPE 639 HOT TOPIC INC HOTT 
607 MICROWAVE FILTER CO INC MFCO 640 GREAT WOLF RESORTS INC WOLF 
608 TRANS WORLD ENTMT CORP TWMC 641 IOMEGA CORP IOM 
609 MTR GAMING GROUP INC MNTG 642 LAKELAND INDUSTRIES INC LAKE 
610 TRAVELCENTERS OF AMERICA 
LLC 
TA 643 DJO INC DJO 
611 JACK IN THE BOX INC JACK 644 CANDELA CORP CLZR 
612 PEP BOYS-MANNY MOE & JACK PBY 645 WAVETEK CORP-OLD WVTK 
613 NORTH HILLS ELECTRONICS INC NOHL 646 COMVERGE INC COMV 
614 FORD MOTOR CO F 647 CUTERA INC CUTR 
615 WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES WGO 648 BARD (C.R.) INC BCR 
616 TORO CO TTC 649 CRAFTMADE INTERNATIONAL 
INC 
CRFT 
617 MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC MU 650 THOMAS & BETTS CORP TNB 
618 ORACLE CORP ORCL 651 SUPERIOR ESSEX INC SPSX 
619 CHORDIANT SOFTWARE INC CHRD 652 KING PHARMACEUTICALS INC KG 
620 FIRST SOLAR INC FSLR 653 EBAY INC EBAY 
621 MASIMO CORP MASI 654 INTL RECTIFIER CORP IRF 
622 CIRCOR INTL INC CIR 655 CROSS COUNTRY HEALTHCARE 
INC 
CCRN 
623 NUANCE COMMUNICATIONS 
INC 
NUAN 656 DOUBLECLICK INC DCLK 
624 WATERS CORP WAT 657 POWERSECURE INTL INC POWR 
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659 CALLAWAY GOLF CO ELY 693 ROCKFORD CORP ROFO 
660 SYNAPTICS INC SYNA 694 ITRON INC ITRI 
661 TUT SYSTEMS INC TUTS 695 OSHKOSH CORP OSK 
662 OMNOVA SOLUTIONS INC OMN 696 MOCON INC MOCO 
663 HARBIN ELECTRIC INC HRBN 697 KVH INDUSTRIES INC KVHI 
664 LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP LVS 698 NEW BRUNSWICK SCIENTIFIC 
INC 
NBSC 
665 GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO GT 699 ANALOG DEVICES ADI 
666 ASHFORD HOSPITALITY TRUST AHT 700 WILD OATS MARKETS INC OATS 
667 LINEAR TECHNOLOGY CORP LLTC 701 CONCEPTUS INC CPTS 
668 OPTICAL RADIATION CORP ORCO 702 ARGOSY GAMING CO AGY 
669 AVERY DENNISON CORP AVY 703 ROSS STORES INC ROST 
670 NETSCAPE COMMUNICATIONS 
CORP 
NSCP 704 ROSETTA STONE INC RST 
671 VEECO INSTRUMENTS INC VECO 705 LITTELFUSE INC LFUS 
672 STAMPS.COM INC STMP 706 ABAXIS INC ABAX 
673 ASTRONOVA INC ALOT 707 SEACHANGE INTERNATIONAL 
INC 
SEAC 
674 XIRCOM INC XIRC 708 RALPH LAUREN CORP RL 
675 CALLIDUS SOFTWARE INC CALD 709 CEM CORP CEMX 
676 GENLYTE GROUP INC GLYT 710 ZOLL MEDICAL CORP ZOLL 
677 DIONEX CORP DNEX 711 REMEDY CORP RMDY 
678 CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS INC CDNS 712 ELECTRONIC DATA 
TECHNOLOGIES 
EDAT 
679 DEL LABORATORIES INC DLI 713 STAPLES INC SPLS 
680 MOLECULAR DEVICES CORP MDCC 714 COMPUTER IDENTICS CORP CIDN 
681 DAKTRONICS INC DAKT 715 HDR POWER SYSTEMS INC HDRP 
682 WYNN RESORTS LTD WYNN 716 CHAMPPS ENTMT INC CMPP 
683 BALLANTYNE STRONG INC BTN 717 AUTODESK INC ADSK 
684 WELLCARE HEALTH PLANS INC WCG 718 TRAK AUTO CORP TRKA 
685 BLOUNT INTL INC BLT 719 COMTECH TELECOMMUN CMTL 
686 8X8 INC EGHT 720 STARRETT (L.S.) CO  -CL A SCX 
687 TENNECO INC TEN 721 ORION ENERGY SYSTEMS INC OESX 
688 IXYS CORP IXYS 722 HI TECH PHARMACAL CO INC HITK 
689 MARCHEX INC MCHX 723 RIVERBED TECHNOLOGY INC RVBD 
690 BEA SYSTEMS INC BEAS 724 NAPCO SECURITY TECH INC NSSC 
691 MATTEL INC MAT 725 AMERICAN LOCKER GROUP INC ALGI 
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727 DATAMARINE INTL INC DMAR 759 PETSMART INC PETM 
728 PRINTRONIX INC PTNX 760 COMPASS DIVERSIFIED 
HOLDINGS 
CODI 
729 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO PG 761 FARR CO FARC 
730 SPACELABS MEDICAL INC SLMD 762 CLARK EQUIPMENT CO CKL 
731 LECROY CORP LCRY 763 DOLLAR TREE INC DLTR 
732 EXTRA SPACE STORAGE INC EXR 764 ARITECH CORP-DEL ARIT 
733 WOODHEAD INDUSTRIES INC WDHD 765 LANTRONIX INC LTRX 
734 SUNSTONE HOTEL INVESTORS 
INC 
SHO 766 FREEMARKETS INC FMKT 
735 CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR 
CORP 
CY 767 LSI INDUSTRIES INC LYTS 
736 TRIZETTO GROUP INC TZIX 768 HOLOGIC INC HOLX 
737 TERADYNE INC TER 769 XYLOGICS INC XLGX 
738 AEQUITRON MEDICAL INC AQTN 770 SANFILIPPO JOHN B&SON JBSS 
739 QUALITY PRODUCTS INC QPDC 771 CARDIAC SCIENCE INC DFIB 
740 COPART INC CPRT 772 AMERICAN MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS 
AMSY 
741 CLEARWIRE CORP CLWR 773 CABELAS INC CAB 
742 ORASURE TECHNOLOGIES INC OSUR 774 IMMUNEX CORP IMNX 
743 COST PLUS INC CPWM 775 ELECTRO SCIENTIFIC INDS INC ESIO 
744 MAXWELL TECHNOLOGIES INC MXWL 776 ILLUMINA INC ILMN 
745 PHOENIX TECHNOLOGIES LTD PTEC 777 PATHMARK STORES INC PTMK 
746 NEWPORT CORP NEWP 778 ROCHESTER MEDICAL CORP ROCM 
747 RIVAL CO RIVL 779 DRUGSTORE.COM INC DSCM 
748 GROUP 1 SOFTWARE INC GSOF 780 DIONICS INC DION 
749 VERTICALNET INC VERT 781 CARROLS RESTAURANT GROUP 
INC 
TAST 
750 INTERNAP CORP INAP 782 APPLIED DIGITAL ACCESS INC ADAX 
751 U S ROBOTICS CORP USRX 783 MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL MGM 
752 HERSHEY CO HSY 784 TELLABS INC TLAB 
753 CYTOGEN CORP CYTO 785 LGL GROUP INC LGL 
754 KNAPE & VOGT MFG CO KNAP 786 KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP KMB 
755 OPTELECOM-NKF INC OPTC 787 GENTEX CORP GNTX 
756 HESKA CORP HSKA 788 LOJACK CORP LOJN 
757 ALAMO GROUP INC ALG 789 MET-COIL SYSTEMS CORP METS 
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791 ADVENT SOFTWARE INC ADVS 825 XILINX INC XLNX 
792 COLUMBUS MCKINNON CORP CMCO 826 AST RESEARCH INC ASTA 
793 BRUNSWICK CORP BC 827 HERLEY INDUSTRIES INC/DE HRLY 
794 KEYNOTE SYSTEMS INC KEYN 828 HARRIS CORP HRS 
795 CANTEL MEDICAL CORP CMD 829 CONCUR TECHNOLOGIES INC CNQR 
796 CPT HOLDING CORP CPTD 830 AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC A 
797 WEYERHAEUSER CO WY 831 FLIR SYSTEMS INC FLIR 
798 PALL CORP PLL 832 STAR GROUP LP SGU 
799 JOS A BANK CLOTHIERS INC JOSB 833 WESLEY JESSEN VISIONCARE 
INC 
WJCO 
800 XYPLEX INC XPLX 834 LIMELIGHT NETWORKS INC LLNW 
801 UDR INC UDR 835 WORTHINGTON FOODS INC WFDS 
802 PERCEPTION TECHNOLOGY 
CORP 
PCEP 836 CARMAX INC KMX 
803 SPECIALTY EQUIPMENT COS 
INC 
SEC 837 ASTEA INTERNATIONAL INC ATEA 
804 MEADE INSTRUMENTS CORP MEAD 838 ESKIMO PIE CORP EPIE 
805 WD-40 CO WDFC 839 SEEQ TECHNOLOGY INC SEEQ 
806 PHILIP MORRIS 
INTERNATIONAL 
PM 840 BLACK & DECKER CORP BDK 
807 EMERSON ELECTRIC CO EMR 841 AUXILIUM PHARMA INC AUXL 
808 KIMBALL INTERNATIONAL  -CL 
B 
KBAL 842 DOLLAR GENERAL CORP DG 
809 ADVANCED ANALOGIC TECH AATI 843 HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDS HAR 
810 3COM CORP COMS 844 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO GE 
811 EDIETS.COM INC DIET 845 SOLTA MEDICAL INC SLTM 
812 LA QUINTA CORP LQI 846 MEDQUIST INC MEDQ 
813 HERSHEY OIL CORP HSO 847 EASTERN CO EML 
814 ADVANCED PHOTONIX INC  -CL 
A 
API 848 WESTERN DIGITAL CORP WDC 
815 VERISK ANALYTICS INC VRSK 849 ROGERS CORP ROG 
816 DIGENE CORP DIGE 850 IDT CORP IDT 
817 QRS CORP QRSI 851 GENERAL BINDING CORP GBND 
818 CYNOSURE INC CYNO 852 MAGMA DESIGN AUTOMATION 
INC 
LAVA 
819 BARE ESCENTUALS INC BARE 853 TELXON CORP TLXN 
820 CENTRAL SPRINKLER CORP CNSP 854 NATHAN'S FAMOUS INC NATH 
821 BRADY CORP BRC 855 RECOVERY ENGINEERING INC REIN 
822 EXIDE ELECTRONICS GROUP 
INC 
XUPS 856 AEROVIRONMENT INC AVAV 
823 COHERENT INC COHR 857 INDUS INTERNATIONAL INC IINT 




Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
859 VECTOR GROUP LTD VGR 891 TCC INDUSTRIES INC TELC 
860 DATAWATCH CORP DWCH 892 BECKMAN COULTER INC BEC 
861 MOLSON COORS BREWING CO TAP 893 VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC VAR 
862 DHI GROUP INC DHX 894 CORNERSTONE THERAPEUTICS 
INC 
CRTX 
863 ELXSI CORP ELXS 895 AMDURA CORP ADU 
864 USG CORP USG 896 NL INDUSTRIES NL 
865 DENTAL MED DIAGNOSTIC SYS DMDS 897 VERSUS TECHNOLOGY INC VSTI 
866 SEQUENT COMPUTER SYSTEMS 
INC 
SQNT 898 SUMTOTAL SYSTEMS INC SUMT 
867 MERCADOLIBRE INC MELI 899 COSMO COMMUNICATIONS 
CORP 
CSMO 
868 FSI INTL INC FSII 900 FAMOUS DAVES OF AMERICA 
INC 
DAVE 
869 CORNING INC GLW 901 ENTERTAINMENT GAMING ASIA EGT 
870 FLEXSTEEL INDUSTRIES INC FLXS 902 SIX FLAGS ENTERTAINMENT 
CORP 
SIX 
871 ESTERLINE TECHNOLOGIES 
CORP 
ESL 903 ASSOCIATED ESTATES RLTY 
CORP 
AEC 
872 BECTON DICKINSON & CO BDX 904 SPORTS AUTHORITY INC TSA 
873 EXTREME NETWORKS INC EXTR 905 GRACO INC GGG 
874 WHOLESALE CLUB INC WHLS 906 L-1 IDENTITY SOLUTIONS INC ID 
875 ECOLAB INC ECL 907 HERITAGE-CRYSTAL CLEAN INC HCCI 
876 COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO CL 908 ECHOSTAR CORP SATS 
877 ARMSTRONG WORLD 
INDUSTRIES 
AWI 909 ROCK OF AGES CORP  -CL A ROAC 
878 PURADYN FILTER 
TECHNOLOGIES 
PFTI 910 RADISYS CORP RSYS 
879 PLANAR SYSTEMS INC PLNR 911 VCAMPUS CORP VCMP 
880 VALSPAR CORP VAL 912 STANDARD MICROSYSTEMS 
CORP 
SMSC 
881 OBAGI MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC OMPI 913 WEISFIELDS INC WEIS 
882 GENUINE PARTS CO GPC 914 KONA GRILL INC KONA 
883 RACKSPACE HOSTING INC RAX 915 LIFE STORAGE INC LSI 
884 KENNAMETAL INC KMT 916 DOCENT INC DCNT 
885 LOWRANCE ELECTRONICS INC LEIX 917 CACHE INC CACH 
886 OPTICAL COATING LAB INC OCLI 918 DATA I/O CORP DAIO 
887 NETFLIX INC NFLX 919 ULTRALIFE CORP ULBI 
888 HAMMONS JOHN Q HOTELS  -CL 
A 
JQH 920 MARTEK BIOSCIENCES CORP MATK 
889 BARRY (R G) CORP DFZ 921 TEREX CORP TEX 





Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
923 NAUTILUS INC NLS 957 FRANKLIN COVEY CO FC 
924 WEIGH-TRONIX INC WGHT 958 BRADLEY PHARMACEUTICL  -CL 
A 
BDY 
925 CENTIGRAM COMMUNICATIONS 
CP 
CGRM 959 QUALMARK CORP QMRK 
926 VMX INC VMXI 960 SUPERIOR ELECTRIC CO SUPE 
927 INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC ISRG 961 VULCAN MATERIALS CO VMC 
928 RUBBERMAID INC RBD 962 NU-KOTE HOLDING INC  -CL A NKOT 
929 MARQUETTE MEDICAL SYS MARQ 963 MET-PRO CORP MPR 
930 TOMOTHERAPY INC TOMO 964 AXT INC AXTI 
931 DR PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP INC DPS 965 ALLIED HEALTHCARE INTL INC AHCI 
932 CAMPBELL SOUP CO CPB 966 KEEBLER FOODS CO KBL 
933 USA TECHNOLOGIES INC USAT 967 SOHU COM LTD SOHU 
934 NIKU CORP NIKU 968 VLSI TECHNOLOGY INC VLSI 
935 STRATAGENE CORP STGN 969 CCA INDUSTRIES INC CAW 
936 TUMBLEWEED 
COMMUNICATIONS CO 
TMWD 970 MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT INC MVL 
937 CETUS CORP CTUS 971 MISONIX INC MSON 
938 SCHIFF NUTRITION INTL INC SHF 972 ELECTRO-NUCLEONICS ENUC 
939 VIVUS INC VVUS 973 EPRESENCE INC EPRE 
940 BIG B INC BIGB 974 CUMMINS INC CMI 
941 O'SULLIVAN INDS HLDGS INC OSU 975 XERIUM TECHNOLOGIES INC XRM 
942 EVANS & SUTHERLAND CMP 
CORP 
ESCC 976 SMITHKLINE BECKMAN CORP SKB 
943 SUSSER HOLDINGS CORP SUSS 977 AVANIR PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 
AVNR 
944 MONOGRAM BIOSCIENCES INC MGRM 978 CHEMED CORP CHE 
945 NATURES SUNSHINE PRODS INC NATR 979 SWITCHBOARD INC SWBD 
946 DATASOUTH COMPUTER CORP DSCC 980 SMITH & WOLLENSKY RSTRNT 
GRP 
SWRG 
947 O I CORP OICO 981 THERAGENICS CORP TGX 
948 IMEX MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC IMEX 982 SYNOPTICS COMMUNICATIONS 
INC 
SNPX 
949 ACME UNITED CORP ACU 983 PARKER-HANNIFIN CORP PH 
950 SABA SOFTWARE INC SABA 984 CHECKPOINT SYSTEMS INC CKP 
951 OMNITURE INC OMTR 985 IMANAGE INC IMAN 
952 MANITEX INTERNATIONAL INC MNTX 986 COMSCORE INC SCOR 
953 ZENITH ELECTRONICS CORP ZE 987 BEI MEDICAL SYSTEMS CO INC BMED 
954 NAPSTER INC NAPS 988 JOHNSON & JOHNSON JNJ 
955 SUPER MICRO COMPUTER INC SMCI 989 KEWAUNEE SCIENTIFIC CORP KEQU 





Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
Rank Company Name Ticker 
Symbol 
991 KAY JEWELERS INC KJI 1029 A S V INC ASVI 
992 EDGAR ONLINE INC EDGR 1030 MERRIMAC INDUSTRIES INC MRM 
993 SPORTSMANS GUIDE INC SGDE 1031 ZILA INC ZILA 
994 DELCHAMPS INC DLCH 1032 NATIONAL FSI INC NFSI 
995 STEELCASE INC SCS 1033 WILAND SERVICES INC WSVS 
996 LA-Z-BOY INC LZB 1034 IMMUCELL CORP ICCC 
997 KELLOGG CO K 1035 ARTEL COMMUNICATIONS CORP AXXX 
998 KEY TRONIC CORP KTCC 1036 ASPEN IMAGING INTL INC ARIB 
999 LOCTITE CORP LOC 1037 TITAN INTERNATIONAL INC TWI 
1000 ON2 TECHNOLOGIES INC ONT 1038 EMBREX INC EMBX 
1001 SBE INC SBEI 1039 JEFFERIES FINANCIAL GRP INC JEF 
1002 VICOR CORP VICR 1040 RED LION HOTELS CORP RLH 
1003 ANDREA ELECTRONICS CORP ANDR 1041 EXE TECHNOLOGIES INC EXEE 
1004 BIOLASE INC BIOL 1042 DAHLBERG INC DAHL 
1005 SIGMA DESIGNS INC SIGM 1043 CTI INDUSTRIES CORP CTIB 
1006 KULICKE & SOFFA INDUSTRIES KLIC 1044 ARIZONA INSTRUMENT CORP AZIC 
1007 MERU NETWORKS INC MERU 1045 INTEGRAL VISION INC INVI 
1008 3D SYSTEMS CORP DDD 1046 VALHI INC VHI 
1009 SPARTON CORP SPA 1047 ASURE SOFTWARE INC ASUR 
1010 CAMBRIDGE MEDICAL TECH 
CORP 
CMTC 1048 RCI HOSPITALITY HLDGS INC RICK 
1011 MORGANS HOTEL GROUP CO MHGC 1049 QUIPP INC QUIP 
1012 TRANSCAT INC TRNS 1050 LILLY (ELI) & CO LLY 
1013 PTC INC PTC 1051 COBRA ELECTRONICS CORP COBR 
1014 REVLON INC  -CL A REV 1052 NUMEREX CORP  -CL A NMRX 
1015 J. ALEXANDER'S HOLDINGS INC JAX 1053 MAUI LAND & PINEAPPLE CO MLP 
1016 GLOBALSTAR INC GSAT 1054 HASTINGS ENTERTAINMENT INC HAST 
1017 BIODELIVERY SCIENCES INTL BDSI 1055 GLOBALSCAPE INC GSB 
1018 HARCOR ENERGY CO HARC 1056 NEWPORT ELECTRONICS INC NEWE 
1019 ALDEN ELECTRONICS INC ADNE 1057 SUN HYDRAULICS CORP SNHY 
1020 JOHNSON OUTDOORS INC  -CL A JOUT 1058 EGAIN CORP EGAN 
1021 COOPER COMPANIES INC COO 1059 SCIENTIFIC GAMES CORP SGMS 
1022 ACORN ENERGY INC ACFN 1060 CYANOTECH CORP CYAN 
1023 NTN BUZZTIME INC NTN 1061 CONVERSANT INC CNVR 
1024 ASPEN TECHNOLOGY INC AZPN 1062 LYRIS INC LYRI 
1025 CAMBIUM LEARNING GROUP 
INC 
ABCD 1063 TAITRON COMPONENTS  -CL A TAIT 
1026 OVERSTOCK.COM INC OSTK 1064 DYNASIL CORP OF AMERICA DYSL 
1027 QUINSTREET INC QNST 1065 TELKONET INC TKOI 




Web Appendix Table 3. Averages and Standard Deviations for Firms with Low  
and High Institutional Common Ownership 
Variable 
Low Common Ownership High Common Ownership 
Average St. Dev Average St. Dev 
Strategic Emphasis -0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.11 
Marketing Capabilities 0.98 0.14 0.98 0.58 
Industry Common Ownership 0.87 0.07 0.87 0.07 
Financial Leverage 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.21 
Percentage Institutional Ownership in Industry 0.57 0.12 0.59 0.11 
Ln(Firm Size) 0.60 2.02 0.79 2.24 






Web Appendix Table 4. Results from Robustness Tests 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Each cell reports the coefficient, Z-score, and p-value. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<0.1; N/A = not applicable; 
 
Model (10) only examines firms that have their largest institutional investor block classified as an investment 
company or an independent investment advisor; Model (11) only examines firms that have their largest 
institutional investor investment strategy classified as quasi-indexers or transient investors. To compute this 
variables, we first download data from Paul Bushee’s Wharton School website11, which provides classifications 
of institutional investors based on their type of investment firm and type of investment strategy. Second, we 
paired this information with the data on the institutional investors from the Thomson Reuters s34 Institutional 
Investor Holdings dataset. Third, we linked the data on institutional investors with individual holdings of firms. 
Fourth, we aggregated the total institutional ownership by their investment strategies.  





Web Appendix Table 5. Results from Firm Size based Additional Analysis 
Panel A. Two-Way and Three-Way Interaction Results Using Arellano-Bond GMM estimation 









Main Effects       
Institutional Common Ownership 5.88 7.31 .000 3.44 2.87 .004 
Marketing Capabilities 5.79 5.79 .000 3.49 2.91 .004 
Strategic Emphasis 11.31 17.21 .000 10.33 15.55 .000 
Two-Way Interactions       
Institutional Common Ownership x 
Marketing Capabilities 
-6.15 -7.39 .000 -3.81 -3.11 .002 
Institutional Common Ownership x  
Strategic Emphasis 
-4.13 -7.86 .000 -3.28 -6.14 .000 
Institutional Common Ownership x  
Firm Size 
0.11 4.20 .000 -0.86 -1.53 .126 
Three-Way Interactions       
Institutional Common Ownership x 
Marketing Capabilities x Firm Size 
   0.95 1.66 .097 
Institutional Common Ownership x  
Strategic Emphasis x Firm Size 
   2.43 8.11 .000 
Controls       
Marketing Capabilities x Firm Size 0.23 7.01 .000 -0.71 -1.26 .207 
Strategic Emphasis x Firm Size 0.91 31.52 .000 -1.49 -5.01 .000 
Marketing Capabilities x Strategic 
Emphasis 
-8.41 -20.03 .000 -8.25 -19.79 .000 
Lagged Performance 0.04 2.10 .035 0.04 2.06 .040 
Institutional Ownership of Firm 0.26 9.33 .000 0.25 9.04 .000 
Industry Institutional Ownership -0.04 -0.52 .605 -0.07 -0.88 .377 
Industry Institutional Common 
Ownership 
-0.13 -1.30 .192 -0.16 -1.61 .108 
Competitive Intensity 0.08 0.91 .362 0.09 0.97 .332 
Financial Leverage -0.08 -3.25 .001 -0.09 -3.70 .000 
Ln(Firm Size) -0.33 -7.95 .000 0.62 1.13 .260 
Model Diagnostics       






Panel B. Subsets of Data by Firm Size 
Model/Variable Smallest 50% 
of Firms in 
Our Sample 
Smallest 75% of 




(Low Firm Size) 
Switching 
Regression  





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Each cell reports the coefficient, Z-score, and p-value. ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<0.1; N/A = not applicable 
 
